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Abstract​.​ ​What​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​fundamental​ ​limits​ ​are​ ​there​ ​in​ ​how​ ​capable​ ​artificial​ ​intelligence 
(AI)​ ​systems​ ​might​ ​become?​ ​Two​ ​questions​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​are​ ​of​ ​interest:​ ​​ ​1)​ ​How​ ​much 
more​ ​capable​ ​could​ ​AI​ ​become​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​humans,​ ​and​ ​2)​ ​how​ ​easily​ ​could​ ​superhuman 
capability​ ​be​ ​acquired?​ ​To​ ​answer​ ​these​ ​questions,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​consider​ ​the​ ​literature​ ​on 
human​ ​expertise​ ​and​ ​intelligence,​ ​discuss​ ​its​ ​relevance​ ​for​ ​AI,​ ​and​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​AI 
could​ ​improve​ ​on​ ​humans​ ​in​ ​two​ ​major​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​and​ ​expertise,​ ​namely 
simulation​ ​and​ ​pattern​ ​recognition.​ ​We​ ​find​ ​that​ ​although​ ​there​ ​are​ ​very​ ​real​ ​limits​ ​to 
prediction,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​still​ ​substantially​ ​improve​ ​on​ ​human​ ​intelligence. 
Introduction 
Since​ ​Turing​ ​(1950),​ ​the​ ​dream​ ​of​ ​artificial​ ​intelligence​ ​(AI)​ ​research​ ​has​ ​been​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​a 
“machine​ ​that​ ​could​ ​think”.​ ​While​ ​current​ ​expert​ ​consensus​ ​believes​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​such​ ​a 
system​ ​to​ ​still​ ​take​ ​several​ ​decades​ ​if​ ​not​ ​more​ ​(Müller​ ​&​ ​Bostrom​ ​2016),​ ​recent​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​AI 
has​ ​still​ ​raised​ ​worries​ ​about​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​involved​ ​with​ ​increasingly​ ​capable​ ​AI​ ​systems 
(Future​ ​of​ ​Life​ ​Institute​ ​2015,​ ​Amodei​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2016). 
 
In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​the​ ​risks​ ​posed​ ​by​ ​near-term​ ​developments,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​AI​ ​systems 
eventually​ ​reaching​ ​superhuman​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​intelligence,​ ​eventually​ ​breaking​ ​out​ ​of​ ​human​ ​control 
(Bostrom​ ​2014).​ ​Various​ ​research​ ​agendas​ ​and​ ​lists​ ​of​ ​research​ ​priorities​ ​have​ ​been​ ​suggested 
for​ ​managing​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​that​ ​this​ ​level​ ​of​ ​capability​ ​would​ ​pose​ ​to​ ​society​ ​(Soares​ ​& 
Fallenstein​ ​2014,​ ​Russell​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2015,​ ​Amodei​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2016,​ ​Taylor​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2016).  
 
For​ ​managing​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​presented​ ​by​ ​increasingly​ ​capable​ ​AI​ ​systems,​ ​one​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​know 
how​ ​capable​ ​those​ ​systems​ ​might​ ​ultimately​ ​become,​ ​and​ ​how​ ​quickly.​ ​If​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​can​ ​rapidly 
achieve​ ​strong​ ​capabilities,​ ​becoming​ ​powerful​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​take​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​before​ ​any 
human​ ​can​ ​react,​ ​then​ ​that​ ​implies​ ​a​ ​very​ ​different​ ​approach​ ​than​ ​one​ ​where​ ​AI​ ​capabilities 
develop​ ​gradually​ ​over​ ​many​ ​decades,​ ​never​ ​getting​ ​substantially​ ​past​ ​the​ ​human​ ​level​ ​(​Sotala 
&​ ​Yampolskiy,​ ​2015​).​ ​We​ ​might​ ​phrase​ ​these​ ​questions​ ​as: 
 
1. How​ ​much​ ​more​ ​capable​ ​can​ ​AIs​ ​become​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​humans? 
2. How​ ​easily​ ​(in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​resources​ ​required)​ ​could​ ​superhuman​ ​capability​ ​be 
acquired? 
 





























































Views​ ​on​ ​these​ ​questions​ ​vary.​ ​Authors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​​Bostrom​ ​(2014)​​ ​and​ ​​Yudkowsky​ ​(2008)​​ ​argue 
for​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​a​ ​fast​ ​leap​ ​in​ ​intelligence,​ ​with​ ​both​ ​offering​ ​hypothetical​ ​example​ ​scenarios 
where​ ​AI​ ​rapidly​ ​acquires​ ​a​ ​dominant​ ​position​ ​over​ ​humanity.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​​Anderson 
(2010)​​ ​and​ ​​Lawrence​ ​(2016)​​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​fundamental​ ​limits​ ​on​ ​predictability​ ​–​ ​and​ ​thus 
intelligence​ ​–​ ​posed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​complexity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment.  
 
The​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​limits​ ​of​ ​intelligence​ ​(Anderson​ ​2010,​ ​Lawrence​ ​2016)​ ​could​ ​be​ ​summarized 
as​ ​saying​ ​that,​ ​past​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​point,​ ​increased​ ​intelligence​ ​is​ ​only​ ​of​ ​limited​ ​benefit,​ ​for​ ​the 
unpredictability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​means​ ​that​ ​you​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​spend​ ​exponentially​ ​more 
resources​ ​to​ ​evaluate​ ​a​ ​vastly​ ​increasing​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​possibilities.  
 
Noise​ ​also​ ​accumulates​ ​over​ ​time,​ ​reducing​ ​the​ ​reliability​ ​of​ ​your​ ​models.​ ​For​ ​many​ ​kinds​ ​of 
predictions,​ ​increasing​ ​the​ ​prediction​ ​window​ ​would​ ​require​ ​an​ ​exponential​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​the 
amount​ ​of​ ​measurements​ ​(Martela​ ​2016).​ ​For​ ​instance,​ ​weather​ ​models​ ​become​ ​increasingly 
uncertain​ ​when​ ​projected​ ​farther​ ​out​ ​in​ ​time.​ ​Forecasters​ ​can​ ​only​ ​access​ ​a​ ​limited​ ​amount​ ​of 
observations​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​weather​ ​system’s​ ​degrees​ ​of​ ​freedom,​ ​and​ ​any​ ​initial​ ​imprecisions 
will​ ​magnify​ ​over​ ​time​ ​and​ ​cause​ ​the​ ​accuracy​ ​to​ ​deteriorate​ ​(​Buizza,​ ​2002​).​ ​In​ ​general,​ ​the 
accuracy​ ​of​ ​any​ ​long-term​ ​prediction​ ​will​ ​be​ ​limited​ ​by​ ​data​ ​uncertainty,​ ​model​ ​uncertainty,​ ​and 
the​ ​available​ ​computational​ ​time.​ ​Similar​ ​considerations​ ​would​ ​also​ ​apply​ ​to​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​predict 
things​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​behavior​ ​of​ ​human​ ​societies.​ ​The​ ​advantage​ ​that​ ​even​ ​a​ ​superhuman 
intelligence​ ​might​ ​have​ ​over​ ​humans​ ​may​ ​be​ ​limited. 
 
On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​obvious​ ​whether​ ​this​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view​ ​really​ ​is​ ​in​ ​conflict​ ​with​ ​the 
assumption​ ​of​ ​AI​ ​being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​quickly​ ​grow​ ​to​ ​become​ ​powerful.​ ​There​ ​being​ ​limits​ ​to​ ​prediction 
does​ ​not​ ​imply​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​would​ ​be​ ​particularly​ ​close​ ​to​ ​the​ ​limits,​ ​nor​ ​that​ ​it​ ​would​ ​necessarily 
take​ ​a​ ​great​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​time​ ​to​ ​move​ ​from​ ​sub-human​ ​to​ ​superhuman​ ​capability. 
 
This​ ​article​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​these​ ​questions​ ​by​ ​considering​ ​what​ ​we​ ​know​ ​about​ ​expertise 
and​ ​intelligence.​ ​After​ ​reviewing​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​research​ ​on​ ​human​ ​expertise,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​discuss​ ​its 
relevance​ ​for​ ​AI,​ ​and​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​improve​ ​on​ ​humans​ ​in​ ​two​ ​major​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​thought 
and​ ​expertise,​ ​namely​ ​simulation​ ​and​ ​pattern​ ​recognition.​ ​Our​ ​current​ ​conclusion​ ​is​ ​that 
although​ ​the​ ​limits​ ​to​ ​prediction​ ​are​ ​real,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​still​ ​substantially​ ​improve​ ​on 
human​ ​intelligence.​ ​The​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​AI​ ​developing​ ​significant​ ​real-world​ ​capabilities​ ​in​ ​a 
relatively​ ​brief​ ​time​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​one​ ​that​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​ruled​ ​out. 
 
Before​ ​examining​ ​these​ ​questions,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​the​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​“capability”​ ​in​ ​more 
detail,​ ​and​ ​justify​ ​our​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​intelligence​ ​as​ ​prediction​ ​ability. 
Capability​ ​and​ ​intelligence​ ​as​ ​prediction​ ​ability 
Bostrom​ ​(2014,​ ​p.​ ​39)​ ​defines​ ​a​ ​superintelligence​ ​as​ ​“any​ ​intellect​ ​that​ ​greatly​ ​exceeds​ ​the 
cognitive​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​in​ ​virtually​ ​all​ ​domains​ ​of​ ​interest”.​ ​Additionally,​ ​Bostrom 





























































(2014,​ ​chap.​ ​3)​ ​defines​ ​three​ ​subcategories​ ​of​ ​a​ ​superintelligence.​ ​A​ ​​speed​ ​superintelligence 
thinks​ ​faster​ ​than​ ​humans;​ ​a​ ​​collective​ ​superintelligence​ ​ ​is​ ​composed​ ​of​ ​many​ ​smaller​ ​intellects 
whose​ ​overall​ ​performance​ ​outstrips​ ​that​ ​of​ ​existing​ ​cognitive​ ​systems;​ ​and​ ​a​ ​​quality 
superintelligence​​ ​is​ ​one​ ​that​ ​is​ ​at​ ​least​ ​as​ ​fast​ ​as​ ​a​ ​human​ ​mind,​ ​and​ ​vastly​ ​qualitatively 
smarter. 
 
In​ ​a​ ​footnote​ ​to​ ​his​ ​original​ ​definition,​ ​Bostrom​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​this​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​superintelligence​ ​can 
be​ ​compared​ ​with​ ​Legg​ ​(2008),​ ​who​ ​defines​ ​intelligence​ ​as​ ​“an​ ​agent’s​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​goals 
in​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​environments”. 
 
This​ ​definition,​ ​originally​ ​from​ ​Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​(2007a),​ ​draws​ ​on​ ​a​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​70​ ​definitions​ ​of 
intelligence​ ​(Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​2007b)​ ​from​ ​various​ ​professional​ ​groups,​ ​dictionaries,​ ​psychologists, 
and​ ​AI​ ​researchers.​ ​Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​(2007a)​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​this​ ​definition​ ​summarizes​ ​the​ ​essential 
features​ ​in​ ​the​ ​various​ ​surveyed​ ​definitions,​ ​in​ ​that​ ​they​ ​generally​ ​discuss​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​who​ ​is 
interacting​ ​with​ ​some​ ​environment​ ​that​ ​is​ ​not​ ​fully​ ​known,​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​various​ ​goals​ ​in​ ​that 
environment,​ ​and​ ​learning​ ​and​ ​exploring​ ​during​ ​that​ ​interaction.  
 
Some​ ​definitions​ ​of​ ​intelligence​ ​list​ ​traits​ ​which​ ​are​ ​not​ ​explicitly​ ​included​ ​in​ ​this​ ​definition;​ ​for 
example,​ ​a​ ​group​ ​statement​ ​signed​ ​by​ ​52​ ​psychologists​ ​(Gottfredson​ ​1997a)​ ​includes​ ​in 
intelligence​ ​"the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​reason,​ ​plan,​ ​solve​ ​problems,​ ​think​ ​abstractly,​ ​comprehend​ ​complex 
ideas,​ ​learn​ ​quickly​ ​and​ ​learn​ ​from​ ​experience".​ ​However,​ ​Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​(2007a)​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​all 
of​ ​these​ ​abilities​ ​are​ ​ones​ ​that​ ​allow​ ​humans​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​goals,​ ​so​ ​are​ ​implicitly​ ​included​ ​in​ ​the 
Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​definition.​ ​Additionally,​ ​Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​their​ ​definition​ ​is​ ​more​ ​general, 
as​ ​there​ ​could​ ​exist​ ​intelligences​ ​which​ ​did​ ​not​ ​have​ ​all​ ​of​ ​these​ ​specific​ ​capabilities,​ ​but​ ​did 
have​ ​alternative​ ​capabilities​ ​which​ ​allowed​ ​them​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​their​ ​goals. 
 
Legg​ ​&​ ​Hutter​ ​(2007a)​ ​offer​ ​a​ ​formalization​ ​of​ ​their​ ​definition,​ ​cast​ ​in​ ​a​ ​reinforcement​ ​learning 
framework.​ ​Briefly,​ ​the​ ​formalization​ ​involves​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​which​ ​interacts​ ​with​ ​an​ ​environment​ ​in 
discrete​ ​timesteps;​ ​on​ ​each​ ​timestep,​ ​the​ ​agent​ ​chooses​ ​an​ ​action​ ​and​ ​receives​ ​both​ ​an 
observation​ ​and​ ​a​ ​reward.​ ​An​ ​agent​ ​is​ ​(universally)​ ​intelligent​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​it​ ​can​ ​maximize 
its​ ​reward​ ​over​ ​the​ ​space​ ​of​ ​all​ ​environments​ ​drawn​ ​from​ ​a​ ​universal​ ​distribution. 
 
This​ ​definition​ ​and​ ​formalization​ ​is​ ​a​ ​view​ ​of​ ​intelligent​ ​performance​ ​as​ ​a​ ​learning​ ​and​ ​prediction 
problem:​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​is​ ​intelligent​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​it​ ​can​ ​learn​ ​to​ ​predict,​ ​using​ ​the​ ​smallest 
possible​ ​set​ ​of​ ​observations,​ ​which​ ​of​ ​its​ ​actions​ ​will​ ​deliver​ ​the​ ​greatest​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​reward​ ​in​ ​the 
environment​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​interacting​ ​with.  
 
Out​ ​of​ ​Bostrom’s​ ​(2014)​ ​superintelligence​ ​subtypes,​ ​a​ ​mind​ ​that​ ​was​ ​superintelligent​ ​under​ ​such 
a​ ​view​ ​would​ ​most​ ​likely​ ​fall​ ​under​ ​the​ ​category​ ​of​ ​a​ ​quality​ ​superintelligence.​ ​Some​ ​of​ ​the 
examples​ ​that​ ​Bostrom​ ​(2014)​ ​offers​ ​to​ ​illustrate​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​quality​ ​intelligence​ ​include 
nonhuman​ ​animals​ ​that​ ​cannot​ ​achieve​ ​human​ ​cognitive​ ​capabilities​ ​even​ ​when​ ​“intensely 
trained​ ​by​ ​human​ ​instructors”,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​human​ ​deficits​ ​such​ ​as​ ​autism​ ​spectrum​ ​disorders​ ​that 
may​ ​impair​ ​e.g.​ ​social​ ​functioning.​ ​Implicit​ ​in​ ​these​ ​examples​ ​is​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​that​ ​nonhuman 





























































animals​ ​and​ ​individuals​ ​with​ ​cognitive​ ​deficits​ ​cannot​ ​achieve​ ​the​ ​same​ ​level​ ​of​ ​performance​ ​in 
various​ ​domains​ ​as​ ​unimpaired​ ​humans​ ​do,​ ​even​ ​when​ ​given​ ​the​ ​same​ ​opportunities​ ​to​ ​observe 
and​ ​learn​ ​about​ ​the​ ​domains​ ​in​ ​question.​ ​They​ ​lack​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​capabilities​ ​that​ ​would​ ​allow 
them​ ​to​ ​utilize​ ​their​ ​observations​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​which​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​actions​ ​would​ ​provide​ ​the 
greatest​ ​success​ ​in​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​domains. 
 
Under​ ​this​ ​view,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​more​ ​precisely​ ​rephrase​ ​our​ ​first​ ​question,​ ​“how​ ​much​ ​more​ ​capable 
can​ ​AIs​ ​become​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​humans”,​ ​as​ ​“how​ ​much​ ​better​ ​than​ ​humans​ ​can​ ​AIs​ ​become​ ​in 
using​ ​small​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​sense​ ​data​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​which​ ​actions​ ​most​ ​effectively​ ​further​ ​their 
goals​”.​ ​For​ ​the​ ​purposes​ ​of​ ​this​ ​discussion,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​also​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​“predicting​ ​which​ ​actions 
most​ ​effectively​ ​further​ ​one’s​ ​goals”​ ​is​ ​an​ ​accurate​ ​characterization​ ​of​ ​what​ ​human​ ​expertise​ ​(in 
any​ ​given​ ​domain)​ ​means.​ ​As​ ​we​ ​will​ ​discuss​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following​ ​section,​ ​the​ ​foundation​ ​of​ ​human 
expertise​ ​lies​ ​in​ ​acquiring​ ​the​ ​necessary​ ​knowledge​ ​to​ ​instantly​ ​see,​ ​when​ ​faced​ ​with​ ​some 
situation,​ ​the​ ​right​ ​course​ ​of​ ​action​ ​for​ ​that​ ​situation. 
The​ ​development​ ​of​ ​human​ ​expertise 
Ideally,​ ​we​ ​might​ ​turn​ ​to​ ​theoretical​ ​AI​ ​research​ ​for​ ​a​ ​precise​ ​theory​ ​about​ ​acquiring​ ​cognitive 
capabilities.​ ​Unfortunately​ ​AI​ ​research​ ​is​ ​not​ ​at​ ​this​ ​point​ ​yet.​ ​Instead​ ​we​ ​will​ ​consider​ ​the 
research​ ​on​ ​human​ ​expertise​ ​and​ ​decision-making.  
Expertise​ ​as​ ​mental​ ​representations 
There​ ​exists​ ​a​ ​preliminary​ ​understanding,​ ​if​ ​not​ ​of​ ​the​ ​details​ ​of​ ​human​ ​decision-making,​ ​then​ ​at 
least​ ​the​ ​general​ ​outline.​ ​A​ ​picture​ ​that​ ​emerges​ ​from​ ​this​ ​research​ ​is​ ​that​ ​​expertise​ ​is​ ​about 
developing​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​​(Klein​ ​1999;​ ​Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool,​ ​2016).  
 
A​ ​mental​ ​representation​ ​is​ ​a​ ​very​ ​general​ ​concept,​ ​roughly​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​any​ ​mental 
structure​ ​forming​ ​the​ ​content​ ​of​ ​something​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​is​ ​thinking​ ​about​ ​(Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool, 
2016). 
 
Domain-specific​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​are​ ​important​ ​because​ ​they​ ​allow​ ​experts​ ​to​ ​know​ ​what 
something​ ​means;​ ​know​ ​what​ ​to​ ​expect;​ ​know​ ​what​ ​good​ ​performance​ ​should​ ​feel​ ​like;​ ​know 
how​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​the​ ​good​ ​performance;​ ​know​ ​the​ ​right​ ​goals​ ​for​ ​a​ ​given​ ​situation;​ ​know​ ​the​ ​steps 
necessary​ ​for​ ​achieving​ ​those​ ​goals;​ ​mentally​ ​simulate​ ​how​ ​something​ ​might​ ​happen;​ ​learn 
more​ ​detailed​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​for​ ​improving​ ​their​ ​skills​ ​(Klein,​ ​1999;​ ​Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool, 
2016). 
 
Although​ ​good​ ​decision-making​ ​is​ ​often​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​as​ ​a​ ​careful​ ​deliberation​ ​of​ ​all​ ​the​ ​possible 
options,​ ​such​ ​a​ ​type​ ​of​ ​thinking​ ​tends​ ​to​ ​be​ ​typical​ ​of​ ​novices​ ​(Klein,​ ​1999).​ ​A​ ​novice​ ​will​ ​have​ ​to 
try​ ​to​ ​carefully​ ​reason​ ​their​ ​way​ ​through​ ​to​ ​an​ ​answer,​ ​and​ ​will​ ​often​ ​do​ ​poorly​ ​regardless, 





























































because​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​know​ ​what​ ​things​ ​are​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​take​ ​into​ ​account​ ​and​ ​which​ ​ones​ ​are​ ​not. 
An​ ​expert​ ​doesn’t​ ​need​ ​to​ ​–​ ​they​ ​are​ ​experienced​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​instantly​ ​know​ ​what​ ​to​ ​do. 
 
A​ ​specific​ ​model​ ​of​ ​expertise​ ​is​ ​the​ ​Recognition-Primed​ ​Decision-Making​ ​(RPD)​ ​model​ ​(Klein, 
1999).​ ​First,​ ​a​ ​decision-maker​ ​sees​ ​some​ ​situation,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​a​ ​fire​ ​for​ ​a​ ​firefighter​ ​or​ ​a​ ​design 
problem​ ​for​ ​an​ ​architect.​ ​The​ ​situation​ ​may​ ​then​ ​be​ ​recognized​ ​as​ ​familiar,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​a​ ​typical 
garage​ ​fire.​ ​Recognizing​ ​a​ ​familiar​ ​situation​ ​means​ ​understanding​ ​what​ ​​goals​​ ​make​ ​sense​ ​and 
what​ ​should​ ​be​ ​focused​ ​on,​ ​which​ ​​cues​ ​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​attention​ ​to,​ ​what​ ​to​ ​​expect​​ ​next​ ​and​ ​when​ ​a 
violation​ ​of​ ​expectations​ ​shows​ ​that​ ​something​ ​is​ ​amiss,​ ​and​ ​knowing​ ​what​ ​the​ ​​typical​ ​ways​ ​of 
responding​ ​are.​​ ​Ideally,​ ​the​ ​expert​ ​will​ ​instantly​ ​know​ ​what​ ​to​ ​do. 
 
The​ ​expectations​ ​arising​ ​from​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​also​ ​give​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​​intuition​.​ ​As​ ​one​ ​example, 
Klein​ ​(1999)​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​a​ ​firefighter​ ​lieutenant​ ​responding​ ​to​ ​a​ ​kitchen​ ​fire​ ​in​ ​an 
ordinary​ ​one-story​ ​residential​ ​house.​ ​The​ ​lieutenant’s​ ​crew​ ​sprayed​ ​water​ ​on​ ​the​ ​fire,​ ​but 
contrary​ ​to​ ​expectations,​ ​the​ ​water​ ​seemed​ ​to​ ​have​ ​little​ ​impact.​ ​Something​ ​about​ ​the​ ​situation 
seemed​ ​wrong​ ​to​ ​the​ ​lieutenant,​ ​who​ ​ordered​ ​his​ ​crew​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​house.​ ​As​ ​soon​ ​as​ ​they​ ​had 
left​ ​the​ ​house,​ ​the​ ​floor​ ​where​ ​they​ ​had​ ​been​ ​standing​ ​collapsed.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​firefighters​ ​had​ ​not 
pulled​ ​out,​ ​they​ ​would​ ​have​ ​fallen​ ​down​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fire​ ​raging​ ​in​ ​the​ ​basement.​ ​The​ ​lieutenant,​ ​not 
knowing​ ​what​ ​had​ ​caused​ ​him​ ​to​ ​give​ ​the​ ​order​ ​to​ ​withdraw,​ ​initially​ ​attributed​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to 
some​ ​form​ ​of​ ​extra-sensory​ ​perception. 
 
In​ ​a​ ​later​ ​interview,​ ​the​ ​lieutenant​ ​explained​ ​that​ ​he​ ​did​ ​not​ ​suspect​ ​that​ ​the​ ​building​ ​had​ ​a 
basement,​ ​nor​ ​that​ ​the​ ​seat​ ​of​ ​the​ ​fire​ ​was​ ​under​ ​the​ ​floor​ ​that​ ​he​ ​and​ ​his​ ​crew​ ​were​ ​standing 
on.​ ​However,​ ​several​ ​of​ ​his​ ​expectations​ ​of​ ​a​ ​typical​ ​kitchen​ ​fire​ ​were​ ​violated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​situation. 
The​ ​lieutenant​ ​was​ ​wondering​ ​why​ ​the​ ​fire​ ​did​ ​not​ ​react​ ​to​ ​water​ ​as​ ​expected,​ ​the​ ​room​ ​was 
much​ ​hotter​ ​than​ ​he​ ​would​ ​have​ ​expected​ ​out​ ​of​ ​a​ ​small​ ​kitchen​ ​fire,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​a​ ​heat​ ​that​ ​hot 
should​ ​have​ ​made​ ​a​ ​great​ ​deal​ ​of​ ​noise,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​very​ ​quiet.​ ​The​ ​mismatch​ ​between​ ​the​ ​expected 
pattern​ ​and​ ​the​ ​actual​ ​situation​ ​led​ ​to​ ​an​ ​intuitive​ ​feeling​ ​of​ ​not​ ​knowing​ ​what​ ​was​ ​going​ ​on, 
leading​ ​to​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​regroup.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​intuition:​ ​an​ ​automatic​ ​comparison​ ​of​ ​the​ ​situation 
against​ ​existing​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​similar​ ​situations,​ ​guiding​ ​decision-making​ ​in​ ​ways 
whose​ ​reasons​ ​are​ ​not​ ​always​ ​consciously​ ​available. 
 
In​ ​an​ ​unfamiliar​ ​situation,​ ​the​ ​expert​ ​may​ ​need​ ​to​ ​construct​ ​a​ ​​mental​ ​simulation​​ ​of​ ​what​ ​is​ ​going 
on,​ ​how​ ​things​ ​might​ ​have​ ​developed​ ​to​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​effect​ ​different​ ​actions​ ​would​ ​have. 
Had​ ​the​ ​floor​ ​mentioned​ ​in​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​example​ ​not​ ​collapsed,​ ​given​ ​time​ ​the​ ​firefighter 
lieutenant​ ​might​ ​have​ ​been​ ​able​ ​to​ ​put​ ​the​ ​pieces​ ​together​ ​and​ ​construct​ ​a​ ​narrative​ ​of​ ​a​ ​fire 
starting​ ​from​ ​the​ ​basement​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​discrepancies.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​future-oriented​ ​example,​ ​a 
firefighter​ ​thinking​ ​about​ ​how​ ​to​ ​rescue​ ​someone​ ​from​ ​a​ ​difficult​ ​spot​ ​might​ ​mentally​ ​simulate 
where​ ​different​ ​rescue​ ​harnesses​ ​might​ ​be​ ​attached​ ​on​ ​the​ ​person,​ ​and​ ​whether​ ​that​ ​would 
exert​ ​dangerous​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​force​ ​on​ ​them.  
 
Mental​ ​representations​ ​are​ ​necessary​ ​for​ ​a​ ​good​ ​simulation,​ ​as​ ​they​ ​let​ ​the​ ​expert​ ​know​ ​what 
things​ ​to​ ​take​ ​into​ ​account,​ ​what​ ​things​ ​could​ ​plausibly​ ​be​ ​tried,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​effects​ ​they​ ​would 





























































have.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​firefighter’s​ ​knowledge​ ​allows​ ​him​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​that​ ​specific​ ​ways​ ​of 
attaching​ ​the​ ​rescue​ ​harness​ ​would​ ​have​ ​dangerous​ ​consequences,​ ​while​ ​others​ ​are​ ​safe. 
Developing​ ​mental​ ​representations 
Mental​ ​representations​ ​are​ ​developed​ ​through​ ​practice.​ ​A​ ​novice​ ​will​ ​try​ ​out​ ​something​ ​and​ ​see 
what​ ​happens​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result.​ ​This​ ​gives​ ​them​ ​a​ ​rough​ ​mental​ ​representation​ ​and​ ​a​ ​prediction​ ​of 
what​ ​might​ ​happen​ ​if​ ​they​ ​try​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​again,​ ​leading​ ​them​ ​to​ ​try​ ​out​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​again 
or​ ​do​ ​something​ ​else​ ​instead.  
 
Just​ ​practice​ ​isn’t​ ​enough,​ ​however​ ​–​ ​there​ ​also​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​feedback.​ ​Someone​ ​may​ ​do​ ​a 
practice​ ​drill​ ​over​ ​and​ ​over​ ​again​ ​and​ ​​think​​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​practicing​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​improving​ ​–​ ​but 
without​ ​some​ ​sign​ ​of​ ​how​ ​well​ ​that​ ​is​ ​going,​ ​they​ ​may​ ​just​ ​keep​ ​repeating​ ​the​ ​same​ ​mistakes 
over​ ​and​ ​over​ ​(Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool,​ ​2016). 
 
The​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​quality​ ​feedback​ ​is​ ​worth​ ​emphasizing.​ ​Skills​ ​do​ ​not​ ​develop​ ​unless​ ​there​ ​is 
feedback​ ​that​ ​is​ ​conducive​ ​to​ ​developing​ ​better​ ​mental​ ​representations.​ ​In​ ​fact,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​entire 
fields​ ​in​ ​which​ ​experienced​ ​practitioners​ ​are​ ​not​ ​much​ ​better​ ​than​ ​novices,​ ​because​ ​the​ ​field 
does​ ​not​ ​provide​ ​them​ ​with​ ​enough​ ​feedback.​ ​​Shanteau​ ​(1992)​​ ​provides​ ​the​ ​following 
breakdown​ ​of​ ​professions​ ​for​ ​which​ ​there​ ​is​ ​agreement​ ​on​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​their​ ​performance: 
 
Good​ ​performance Bad​ ​performance 
 
Weather​ ​Forecasters Clinical​ ​Psychologists 
Livestock​ ​Judges Psychiatrists 
Astronomers Astrologers 
Test​ ​Pilots Student​ ​Admissions 
Soil​ ​Judges Court​ ​Judges 
Chess​ ​Masters Behavioral​ ​Researchers 
Physicists Counselors 
Mathematicians Personnel​ ​Selectors 
Accountants Parole​ ​Officers 
Grain​ ​Inspectors Polygraph​ ​(Lie​ ​Detector)​ ​Judges 
Photo​ ​Interpreters Intelligence​ ​Analysts 
Insurance​ ​Analysts Stock​ ​Brokers 
 
In​ ​analyzing​ ​why​ ​some​ ​domains​ ​enable​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​genuine​ ​expertise​ ​and​ ​others​ ​don’t, 
Shanteau​ ​identified​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​considerations​ ​that​ ​relate​ ​to​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​feedback.​ ​In​ ​an 
occupation​ ​like​ ​weather​ ​forecasting,​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​you​ ​use​ ​for​ ​forecasting​ ​are​ ​always​ ​the​ ​same; 
you​ ​will​ ​always​ ​be​ ​facing​ ​the​ ​same​ ​task​ ​and​ ​can​ ​practice​ ​it​ ​over​ ​and​ ​over;​ ​you​ ​get​ ​quick​ ​and 
feedback​ ​on​ ​whether​ ​your​ ​prediction​ ​was​ ​correct;​ ​you​ ​can​ ​use​ ​formal​ ​tools​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​what​ ​you 
predicted​ ​would​ ​happen​ ​and​ ​why​ ​that​ ​prediction​ ​did​ ​or​ ​didn’t​ ​happen;​ ​and​ ​things​ ​can​ ​be 





























































analyzed​ ​in​ ​objective​ ​terms.​ ​This​ ​allows​ ​weather​ ​forecasters​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​powerful​ ​mental 
representations​ ​that​ ​get​ ​better​ ​and​ ​better​ ​at​ ​making​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​prediction. 
 
Contrast​ ​this​ ​with​ ​someone​ ​like​ ​an​ ​intelligence​ ​analyst.​ ​The​ ​analyst​ ​may​ ​be​ ​called​ ​upon​ ​to 
analyze​ ​very​ ​different​ ​clues​ ​and​ ​situations;​ ​each​ ​of​ ​the​ ​tasks​ ​may​ ​be​ ​unique,​ ​making​ ​it​ ​harder​ ​to 
know​ ​which​ ​lessons​ ​from​ ​previous​ ​tasks​ ​apply;​ ​for​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​analyses,​ ​one​ ​might​ ​never​ ​know 
whether​ ​they​ ​were​ ​right​ ​or​ ​not;​ ​and​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​socio-cultural​ ​matters​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​be​ ​much 
more​ ​subjective​ ​than​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​weather,​ ​making​ ​objective​ ​analysis​ ​impossible.​ ​In​ ​short, 
for​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​work​ ​that​ ​the​ ​analyst​ ​does,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​no​ ​feedback​ ​available​ ​to​ ​tell​ ​whether 
the​ ​analyst​ ​has​ ​made​ ​the​ ​right​ ​judgment​ ​or​ ​not.​ ​And​ ​without​ ​feedback,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​way​ ​to 
improve​ ​one’s​ ​mental​ ​representations,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​expertise. 
 
A​ ​slightly​ ​different​ ​look​ ​on​ ​expertise​ ​is​ ​the​ ​heuristics​ ​&​ ​biases​ ​literature,​ ​which​ ​frequently 
portrays​ ​even​ ​experts​ ​as​ ​being​ ​easily​ ​mistaken.​ ​In​ ​contrast,​ ​the​ ​expertise​ ​literature​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have 
reviewed​ ​so​ ​far​ ​has​ ​viewed​ ​experts​ ​as​ ​being​ ​typically​ ​capable​ ​and​ ​as​ ​having​ ​trustworthy 
intuition.​ ​​Kahneman​ ​&​ ​Klein​ ​(2009)​​ ​make​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​reconcile​ ​the​ ​two​ ​fields,​ ​and​ ​come​ ​to 
agree​ ​that: 
 
● Expert​ ​intuition​ ​may​ ​be​ ​trustworthy,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​intuition​ ​relates​ ​to​ ​a​ ​'high-validity'​ ​domain​ ​and 
the​ ​expert​ ​has​ ​had​ ​a​ ​chance​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​the​ ​regularities​ ​in​ ​that​ ​domain. 
● A​ ​domain​ ​is​ ​'high-validity'​ ​if​ ​'there​ ​are​ ​stable​ ​relationships​ ​between​ ​objectively 
identifiable​ ​cues​ ​and​ ​subsequent​ ​events​ ​or​ ​between​ ​cues​ ​and​ ​the​ ​outcomes​ ​of​ ​possible 
actions'.  
● Medicine​ ​and​ ​firefighting​ ​have​ ​fairly​ ​high​ ​validity,​ ​whereas​ ​predictions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​future​ ​value 
of​ ​individual​ ​stocks​ ​and​ ​long-term ​ ​forecasts​ ​of​ ​political​ ​events​ ​are​ ​domains​ ​with 1
practically​ ​zero​ ​validity. 
● “Some​ ​[domains]​ ​are​ ​both​ ​highly​ ​valid​ ​and​ ​substantially​ ​uncertain.​ ​Poker​ ​and​ ​warfare​ ​are 
examples.​ ​The​ ​best​ ​moves​ ​in​ ​such​ ​situations​ ​reliably​ ​increase​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​for​ ​success.” 
● “[A​ ​domain]​ ​of​ ​high​ ​validity​ ​is​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​condition​ ​for​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​skilled 
intuitions.​ ​Other​ ​necessary​ ​conditions​ ​include​ ​adequate​ ​opportunities​ ​for​ ​learning​ ​the 
[domain]​ ​(prolonged​ ​practice​ ​and​ ​feedback​ ​that​ ​is​ ​both​ ​rapid​ ​and​ ​unequivocal).​ ​If​ ​[a 
domain]​ ​provides​ ​valid​ ​cues​ ​and​ ​good​ ​feedback,​ ​skill​ ​and​ ​expert​ ​intuition​ ​will​ ​eventually 
develop​ ​in​ ​individuals​ ​of​ ​sufficient​ ​talent.​ ​“ 
 
This​ ​consensus​ ​is​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​what​ ​we​ ​have​ ​covered​ ​so​ ​far,​ ​though​ ​it​ ​also​ ​includes​ ​the 
consideration​ ​of​ ​validity.​ ​One​ ​cannot​ ​learn​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​that​ ​would​ ​predict​ ​a​ ​domain 
or​ ​dictate​ ​the​ ​right​ ​actions​ ​for​ ​different​ ​situations​ ​in​ ​a​ ​domain,​ ​if​ ​that​ ​domain​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​too 
complicated​ ​or​ ​chaotic​ ​to​ ​be​ ​predicted.​ ​Kahneman​ ​&​ ​Klein​ ​(2009)​ ​provide​ ​an​ ​illustrative 
example​ ​of​ ​domain​ ​being​ ​simply​ ​too​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​interpret:​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​how​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of​ ​the​ ​20th 
century​ ​would​ ​have​ ​been​ ​different​ ​if​ ​the​ ​fertilized​ ​eggs​ ​that​ ​became​ ​Hitler,​ ​Stalin​ ​and​ ​Mao​ ​had 
1 ​ ​Kahneman​ ​&​ ​Klein​ ​do​ ​not​ ​define​ ​what​ ​they​ ​mean​ ​by​ ​'long-term',​ ​but​ ​geopolitical​ ​events​ ​up​ ​to​ ​a​ ​year​ ​or 
so​ ​away​ ​can​ ​be​ ​predicted​ ​with​ ​reasonable​ ​accuracy,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​accuracy​ ​falling​ ​towards​ ​chance​ ​for​ ​events 
3​ ​to​ ​5​ ​years​ ​away.​ ​(Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​2015,​ ​p.​ ​5). 





























































been​ ​female.​ ​It​ ​seems​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​things​ ​would​ ​have​ ​developed​ ​very​ ​differently,​ ​but​ ​how​ ​exactly? 
There​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​no​ ​way​ ​to​ ​know. 
 
Meanwhile,​ ​practice​ ​does​ ​help​ ​in​ ​more​ ​predictable​ ​domains.​ ​A​ ​recent​ ​meta-analysis 
(​Macnamara,​ ​Hambrick,​ ​&​ ​Oswald,​ ​2014​)​ ​on​ ​the​ ​effects​ ​of​ ​practice​ ​on​ ​skill​ ​found​ ​that​ ​the​ ​more 
predictable​ ​an​ ​activity​ ​was,​ ​the​ ​more​ ​practice​ ​contributed​ ​to​ ​performance​ ​in​ ​that​ ​activity. 
Implications​ ​for​ ​AI 
Having​ ​reviewed​ ​some​ ​necessary​ ​background,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​now​ ​finally​ ​get​ ​back​ ​to​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​of 
superintelligence​ ​capabilities. 
Relevance​ ​for​ ​AI 
Similarly​ ​to​ ​humans,​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​cannot​ ​reach​ ​intelligent​ ​conclusions​ ​by​ ​a​ ​mere​ ​brute​ ​force 
calculation​ ​of​ ​every​ ​possibility.​ ​Rather,​ ​an​ ​intelligence​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​to​ ​exploit​ ​predictable 
regularities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​further.​ ​All​ ​machine​ ​learning​ ​based​ ​systems​ ​are 
based​ ​on​ ​this​ ​principle:​ ​they​ ​learn​ ​models​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that​ ​are​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​the 
mental​ ​representations​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​learn. 
 
However,​ ​the​ ​models​ ​employed​ ​by​ ​current​ ​machine​ ​learning​ ​systems​ ​are​ ​much​ ​more​ ​limited 
than​ ​the​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​employed​ ​by​ ​humans​ ​(Lake​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2016).​ ​Machine​ ​learning 
systems​ ​are​ ​also​ ​developed​ ​for​ ​solving​ ​problems​ ​efficiently​ ​on​ ​existing​ ​computing​ ​hardware 
rather​ ​than​ ​for​ ​being​ ​biologically​ ​plausible.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​thus​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​expect​ ​even​ ​future​ ​AI 
systems​ ​to​ ​employ​ ​models​ ​which​ ​differ​ ​in​ ​various​ ​respects​ ​from​ ​the​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​used 
by​ ​humans.​ ​As​ ​such,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​use​ ​the​ ​term​ ​“mental​ ​representations”​ ​when​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of 
humans,​ ​and​ ​“models”​ ​when​ ​discussing​ ​the​ ​analogous​ ​structure​ ​in​ ​future​ ​AI​ ​systems. 
 
In​ ​a​ ​sense,​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​contain​ ​the​ ​optimal​ ​solutions​ ​to​ ​the​ ​problems​ ​at​ ​hand​ ​(Klein 
1999):​ ​a​ ​human​ ​expert​ ​will​ ​have​ ​learned​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​the​ ​smallest​ ​set​ ​of​ ​cues​ ​that​ ​will​ ​let​ ​them 
know​ ​how​ ​to​ ​act​ ​in​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​situation;​ ​their​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​encode​ ​information​ ​about 
how​ ​to​ ​choose​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​actions​ ​using​ ​the​ ​least​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​thought.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​an​ ​expert 
pays​ ​attention​ ​exactly​ ​to​ ​the​ ​features​ ​in​ ​the​ ​data​ ​which​ ​are​ ​relevant​ ​for​ ​making​ ​the​ ​decision,​ ​and 
acts​ ​accordingly.​ ​An​ ​AI’s​ ​models​ ​could​ ​use​ ​more​ ​data​ ​and​ ​become​ ​larger​ ​than​ ​human​ ​mental 
representations,​ ​and​ ​identify​ ​features​ ​which​ ​humans​ ​might​ ​have​ ​missed.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​however​ ​no 
advantage​ ​in​ ​using​ ​more​ ​data​ ​than​ ​necessary​ ​for​ ​making​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​decision,​ ​so​ ​at​ ​least​ ​a 
subset​ ​of​ ​the​ ​AI’s​ ​models​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​in​ ​that​ ​they​ ​encode​ ​the 
smallest​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​which​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​rapid​ ​and​ ​correct 
decision-making​ ​in​ ​a​ ​given​ ​context​ ​and​ ​for​ ​a​ ​given​ ​goal. 
 
It​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​that​ ​AIs​ ​would​ ​​also​​ ​come​ ​to​ ​have​ ​models​ ​for​ ​which​ ​this​ ​characterization​ ​was​ ​a 
poor​ ​fit​ ​and​ ​which​ ​were​ ​tailored​ ​for​ ​taking​ ​better​ ​advantage​ ​of​ ​e.g.​ ​an​ ​AI’s​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​process 





























































more​ ​data​ ​at​ ​a​ ​time.​ ​We​ ​will​ ​not​ ​examine​ ​this​ ​more​ ​speculative​ ​possibility,​ ​as​ ​for​ ​our​ ​argument​ ​it 
is​ ​unnecessary​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​hypothetical​ ​models​ ​which​ ​are​ ​​better​​ ​than​ ​human​ ​mental 
representations;​ ​we​ ​are​ ​focused​ ​on​ ​establishing​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​that​ ​roughly​ ​human-like​ ​models 
would​ ​already​ ​be​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​enable​ ​superhuman​ ​capability . 2
 
Like​ ​with​ ​human​ ​experts,​ ​machine​ ​learning​ ​also​ ​tries​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​its​ ​analysis​ ​on​ ​exactly​ ​the​ ​right 
number​ ​of​ ​cues​ ​that​ ​will​ ​provide​ ​the​ ​right​ ​predictions,​ ​ignoring​ ​any​ ​irrelevant​ ​information. 
Traditional​ ​machine​ ​learning​ ​approaches​ ​have​ ​relied​ ​extensively​ ​on​ ​​feature​ ​engineering​,​ ​a 
labor-intensive​ ​process​ ​where​ ​humans​ ​determine​ ​which​ ​cues​ ​in​ ​the​ ​data​ ​are​ ​worth​ ​paying 
attention​ ​to.  
 
A​ ​major​ ​reason​ ​behind​ ​the​ ​recent​ ​success​ ​of​ ​deep​ ​learning​ ​models​ ​is​ ​their​ ​capability​ ​for​ ​​feature 
learning​​ ​or​ ​​representation​ ​learning​:​ ​being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​independently​ ​discover​ ​high-level​ ​features​ ​in 
the​ ​data​ ​which​ ​are​ ​worth​ ​paying​ ​attention​ ​to,​ ​without​ ​(as​ ​much)​ ​external​ ​guidance​ ​(​Bengio, 
Courville,​ ​&​ ​Vincent,​ ​2012​).​ ​Being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​and​ ​extract​ ​the​ ​most​ ​important​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the 
data​ ​allows​ ​the​ ​system​ ​to​ ​make​ ​its​ ​decisions​ ​based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​smallest​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​cues​ ​that​ ​allows 
it​ ​to​ ​reach​ ​the​ ​right​ ​judgment​ ​–​ ​just​ ​as​ ​human​ ​experts​ ​learn​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​the​ ​most​ ​relevant​ ​cues​ ​in 
the​ ​situations​ ​that​ ​they​ ​encounter. 
 
Finally,​ ​the​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​increasingly​ ​detailed​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​giving​ ​an​ ​expert​ ​a​ ​yardstick​ ​to 
compare​ ​their​ ​performance​ ​against​ ​(Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool​ ​2016)​ ​has​ ​an​ ​analogue​ ​in​ ​reinforcement 
learning​ ​methods.​ ​In​ ​deep​ ​reinforcement​ ​learning,​ ​a​ ​deep​ ​learning​ ​model​ ​learns​ ​to​ ​estimate​ ​how 
valuable​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​state​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is,​ ​after​ ​which​ ​the​ ​system​ ​takes​ ​actions​ ​to​ ​move​ ​the​ ​world 
towards​ ​that​ ​state​ ​(​Mnih​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2015​).​ ​Similarly,​ ​a​ ​human​ ​expert​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​that​ ​specific 
states​ ​(e.g.​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​feeling​ ​in​ ​the​ ​body​ ​when​ ​diving)​ ​are​ ​valuable,​ ​and​ ​can​ ​then​ ​increasingly 
orient​ ​their​ ​behavior​ ​so​ ​as​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​this​ ​state. 
 
In​ ​summary,​ ​human​ ​experts​ ​use​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​as​ ​the​ ​building​ ​blocks​ ​of​ ​their​ ​expertise, 
with​ ​the​ ​models​ ​employed​ ​by​ ​current​ ​state-of-the-art​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​having​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​key 
similarities.​ ​As​ ​there​ ​have​ ​been​ ​no​ ​serious​ ​alternative​ ​accounts​ ​presented​ ​of​ ​how​ ​expertise 
might​ ​work,wewill​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​the​ ​capabilities​ ​of​ ​hypothetical​ ​superintelligences​ ​will​ ​depend,​ ​at 
least​ ​in​ ​part,​ ​on​ ​them​ ​developing​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​models​ ​to​ ​represent​ ​key​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the 
environment​ ​in​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​way​ ​as​ ​human​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​do. 
 
This​ ​paper​ ​set​ ​out​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​two​ ​main​ ​questions: 
 
1. How​ ​much​ ​more​ ​capable​ ​can​ ​AIs​ ​become​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​humans? 
2 ​ ​The​ ​reader​ ​may​ ​note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​possibly​ ​using​ ​many​ ​different​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​models,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​them​ ​humanlike 
and​ ​some​ ​more​ ​advanced,​ ​has​ ​a​ ​parallel​ ​in​ ​the​ ​heterogeneity​ ​hypothesis​ ​of​ ​concepts​ ​(Machery​ ​2009, 
2010),​ ​according​ ​to​ ​which​ ​the​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​do​ ​not​ ​form​ ​a​ ​natural​ ​kind​ ​and​ ​actually 
consist​ ​of​ ​many​ ​different​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​structures​ ​that​ ​are​ ​used​ ​in​ ​different​ ​situations​ ​and​ ​for​ ​different 
purposes. 





























































2. How​ ​easily​ ​(in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​resources​ ​required)​ ​could​ ​superhuman​ ​capability​ ​be 
acquired? 
 
Let​ ​us​ ​now​ ​return​ ​to​ ​these. 
 
The​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​AI’s​ ​predictive​ ​capabilities​ ​being​ ​limited​ ​was​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​limits​ ​to​ ​prediction, 
and​ ​that​ ​predicting​ ​events​ ​an​ ​ever-increasing​ ​amount​ ​forward​ ​in​ ​time​ ​requires​ ​exponential 
reasoning​ ​power​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​measurement​ ​points,​ ​quickly​ ​becoming​ ​intractable.​ ​How​ ​capable 
could​ ​AI​ ​become​ ​despite​ ​these​ ​two​ ​points? 
 
The​ ​components​ ​of​ ​human​ ​expertise​ ​might​ ​be​ ​roughly​ ​divided​ ​into​ ​two:​ ​building​ ​up​ ​a​ ​battery​ ​of 
accurate​ ​mental​ ​representations,​ ​and​ ​being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​use​ ​them​ ​for​ ​mental​ ​simulations.​ ​Similarly, 
approaches​ ​to​ ​artificial​ ​intelligence​ ​can​ ​roughly​ ​be​ ​divided​ ​into​ ​pattern​ ​recognition​ ​and 
model-building​ ​(​Lake,​ ​Ullman,​ ​Tenenbaum,​ ​&​ ​Gershman,​ ​2016​),​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​whether​ ​patterns 
in​ ​data​ ​or​ ​models​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​are​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​unit​ ​of​ ​thought. 
 
As​ ​this​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​a​ ​distinction​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​emerge​ ​both​ ​from​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​AI​ ​research,wewill 
assume​ ​that​ ​AI’s​ ​expertise​ ​will​ ​also​ ​involve​ ​acquiring​ ​models​ ​(or​ ​equivalently,​ ​doing​ ​pattern 




An​ ​interesting​ ​look​ ​at​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​benefits​ ​offered​ ​by​ ​improved​ ​simulation​ ​ability​ ​come​ ​from 
looking​ ​at​ ​Philip​ ​Tetlock’s​ ​Good​ ​Judgement​ ​Project​ ​(GJP),​ ​popularized​ ​in​ ​the​ ​book 
Superforecasting​ ​​(Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner,​ ​2015) .​ ​Participating​ ​in​ ​a​ ​contest​ ​to​ ​forecast​ ​the 3
probability​ ​of​ ​various​ ​events,​ ​the​ ​best​ ​GJP​ ​participants​ ​–​ ​the​ ​so-called​ ​'superforecasters'​ ​– 
managed​ ​to​ ​make​ ​predictions​ ​whose​ ​accuracy​ ​outperformed​ ​those​ ​of​ ​professional​ ​intelligence 
analysts​ ​working​ ​with​ ​access​ ​to​ ​classified​ ​data .​ ​This​ ​is​ ​particularly​ ​interesting​ ​as​ ​the 4
superforecasters​ ​had​ ​no​ ​particular​ ​domain​ ​expertise​ ​in​ ​answering​ ​most​ ​of​ ​the​ ​questions,​ ​with 
sample​ ​questions​ ​including​ ​ones​ ​such​ ​as 
 
● Will​ ​North​ ​Korea​ ​launch​ ​a​ ​new​ ​multistage​ ​missile​ ​before​ ​May​ ​10,​ ​2014? 
3 ​ ​Except​ ​for​ ​when​ ​citations​ ​to​ ​other​ ​content​ ​are​ ​explicitly​ ​included,​ ​all​ ​the​ ​discussion​ ​about 
superforecasters​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Good​ ​Judgment​ ​Project​ ​uses​ ​​Superforecasting​​ ​as​ ​its​ ​source. 
4 ​ ​Though​ ​this​ ​claim​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​with​ ​some​ ​caution,​ ​as​ ​no​ ​official​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​intelligence 
analysts’​ ​performance​ ​has​ ​been​ ​published.​ ​The​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​based​ ​on​ ​Washington​ ​Post​ ​editor​ ​David​ ​Ignatius 
writing​ ​that​ ​'a​ ​participant​ ​in​ ​the​ ​project'​ ​had​ ​told​ ​him​ ​that​ ​superforecasters​ ​had​ ​'performed​ ​about​ ​30 
percent​ ​better​ ​than​ ​the​ ​average​ ​for​ ​intelligence​ ​community​ ​analysts​ ​who​ ​could​ ​read​ ​intercepts​ ​and​ ​other 
secret​ ​data'​ ​(​Ignatius,​ ​2013​).​ ​The​ ​intelligence​ ​community​ ​has​ ​neither​ ​confirmed​ ​nor​ ​denied​ ​this​ ​statement, 
and​ ​Philip​ ​Tetlock​ ​has​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​he​ ​believes​ ​it​ ​to​ ​be​ ​true. 





























































● Will​ ​Russian​ ​armed​ ​forces​ ​enter​ ​Kharkiv,​ ​Ukraine,​ ​by​ ​May​ ​10,​ ​2014? 
● Will​ ​there​ ​be​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​attack​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​territory​ ​before​ ​May​ ​10,​ ​2014? 
● Will​ ​Robert​ ​Mugabe​ ​cease​ ​to​ ​be​ ​President​ ​of​ ​Zimbabwe​ ​by​ ​September​ ​30,​ ​2011? 
● Will​ ​Greece​ ​remain​ ​a​ ​member​ ​of​ ​the​ ​EU​ ​through​ ​June​ ​1,​ ​2012? 
 
Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​report​ ​the​ ​superforecasters’​ ​accuracy​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​​Brier​ ​score​,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​a​ ​scale 
between​ ​0​ ​and​ ​2,​ ​with​ ​0.5​ ​indicating​ ​random​ ​guessing .​ ​On​ ​this​ ​scale,​ ​superforecasters​ ​had​ ​a 5
score​ ​of​ ​0.25​ ​at​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​GJP’s​ ​first​ ​year,​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​0.37​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​forecasters 
participating​ ​in​ ​the​ ​project.​ ​By​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​second​ ​year,​ ​superforecasters​ ​had​ ​improved​ ​their 
Brier​ ​score​ ​to​ ​0.07​ ​(​Mellers​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2014​).​ ​Superforecasters​ ​could​ ​also​ ​project​ ​further​ ​out​ ​in​ ​time: 
their​ ​accuracy​ ​at​ ​making​ ​predictions​ ​300​ ​days​ ​out​ ​was​ ​better​ ​as​ ​the​ ​other​ ​forecasters’​ ​accuracy 
at​ ​making​ ​predictions​ ​100​ ​days​ ​out.​ ​In​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​being​ ​on​ ​the​ ​right​ ​side​ ​of​ ​50/50,​ ​GJP’s​ ​best 
wisdom-of-the-crowd​ ​algorithms​ ​(deriving​ ​an​ ​overall​ ​prediction​ ​from​ ​the​ ​different​ ​forecasters’ 
predictions)​ ​delivered​ ​a​ ​correct​ ​prediction​ ​on​ ​86%​ ​of​ ​all​ ​daily​ ​forecasts​ ​(​Tetlock,​ ​Mellers,​ ​& 
Rohrbaugh,​ ​2014​). 
 
The​ ​superforecasters’​ ​success​ ​relied​ ​on​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​techniques,​ ​but​ ​a​ ​central​ ​one​ ​was​ ​the 
ability​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​and​ ​judge​ ​the​ ​relevance​ ​of​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​factors​ ​that​ ​might​ ​cause​ ​a​ ​prediction 
to​ ​become​ ​true​ ​or​ ​false.​ ​Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​illustrate​ ​this​ ​technique​ ​by​ ​discussing​ ​how​ ​a 
superforecaster,​ ​Bill​ ​Flack,​ ​approached​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​an​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​Yasser 
Arafat’s​ ​remains​ ​would​ ​reveal​ ​traces​ ​of​ ​polonium,​ ​suggestive​ ​of​ ​Arafat​ ​having​ ​been​ ​poisoned​ ​by 
Israel.  
 
Flack​ ​started​ ​by​ ​considering​ ​what​ ​it​ ​would​ ​take​ ​for​ ​the​ ​investigation​ ​to​ ​reach​ ​a​ ​particular 
outcome,​ ​and​ ​realized​ ​that​ ​he​ ​didn’t​ ​know​ ​what​ ​the​ ​chances​ ​were​ ​of​ ​polonium​ ​traces​ ​surviving 
in​ ​a​ ​body​ ​for​ ​several​ ​years.​ ​He​ ​started​ ​by​ ​investigating​ ​how​ ​polonium​ ​testing​ ​worked,​ ​and 
concluded​ ​that​ ​enough​ ​polonium​ ​could​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​survive​ ​for​ ​it​ ​to​ ​be​ ​found​ ​in​ ​the​ ​testing. 
 
Next,​ ​Flack​ ​considered​ ​what​ ​​could​​ ​cause​ ​polonium​ ​to​ ​end​ ​up​ ​in​ ​the​ ​body.​ ​Israel​ ​poisoning 
Arafat​ ​could​ ​have​ ​done​ ​it,​ ​but​ ​so​ ​could​ ​an​ ​Palestinian​ ​enemy​ ​that​ ​Arafat​ ​had.​ ​There​ ​was​ ​also 
the​ ​probability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body​ ​being​ ​intentionally​ ​contaminated​ ​after​ ​Arafat’s​ ​death,​ ​by​ ​some​ ​faction 
trying​ ​to​ ​frame​ ​Israel​ ​for​ ​the​ ​death.​ ​Each​ ​possibility​ ​made​ ​a​ ​positive​ ​test​ ​result​ ​more​ ​probable, 
based​ ​on​ ​how​ ​probable​ ​those​ ​individual​ ​possibilities​ ​were.​ ​Next​ ​Flack​ ​moved​ ​on​ ​to​ ​investigate 
what​ ​it​ ​would​ ​take​ ​for​ ​any​ ​of​ ​the​ ​possibilities​ ​to​ ​be​ ​true.​ ​For​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​poisoning​ ​Arafat,​ ​it 
required​ ​Israel​ ​having​ ​access​ ​to​ ​polonium;​ ​Israel​ ​being​ ​willing​ ​to​ ​take​ ​the​ ​risk​ ​of​ ​intentionally 
poisoning​ ​him;​ ​and​ ​Israel​ ​having​ ​the​ ​means​ ​to​ ​poison​ ​Arafat​ ​with​ ​the​ ​polonium.​ ​These 
possibilities​ ​served​ ​as​ ​starting​ ​points​ ​for​ ​researching​ ​the​ ​probability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“Israel​ ​poisoned 
Arafat”​ ​hypothesis,​ ​after​ ​which​ ​Flack​ ​would​ ​break​ ​down​ ​and​ ​investigate​ ​what​ ​it​ ​would​ ​take​ ​for 
the​ ​other​ ​hypotheses​ ​to​ ​be​ ​true. 
 
5 ​ ​A​ ​version​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scale​ ​which​ ​ranges​ ​between​ ​0​ ​and​ ​1​ ​is​ ​also​ ​commonly​ ​used. 





























































Tetlock​ ​does​ ​not​ ​go​ ​into​ ​detail​ ​about​ ​the​ ​prerequisites​ ​for​ ​being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​out​ ​such​ ​analysis​ ​– 
other​ ​than​ ​noting​ ​that​ ​it’s​ ​slow​ ​and​ ​effortful​ ​–​ ​but​ ​there​ ​are​ ​some​ ​considerations​ ​that​ ​seem​ ​like 
plausible​ ​prerequisites.​ ​First,​ ​a​ ​person​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​have​ ​enough​ ​general​ ​knowledge​ ​to​ ​generate 
different​ ​possibilities​ ​for​ ​how​ ​an​ ​event​ ​could​ ​have​ ​come​ ​true.​ ​Next,​ ​they​ ​need​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to 
analyze​ ​and​ ​investigate​ ​those​ ​possibilities​ ​further,​ ​either​ ​personally​ ​acquiring​ ​the​ ​relevant 
domain​ ​knowledge​ ​for​ ​evaluating​ ​their​ ​plausibility,​ ​or​ ​finding​ ​a​ ​relevant​ ​subject​ ​matter​ ​expert.​ ​In 
this​ ​example,​ ​Flack​ ​familiarized​ ​himself​ ​with​ ​the​ ​science​ ​of​ ​polonium​ ​testing​ ​until​ ​he​ ​was 
satisfied​ ​that​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​detect​ ​polonium​ ​traces​ ​from​ ​a​ ​long​ ​time​ ​ago. 
 
This​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​general​ ​procedure​ ​which​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​also​ ​follow​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of 
something​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​yet​ ​have​ ​expertise.​ ​An​ ​AI​ ​that​ ​was​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​outcome 
of​ ​some​ ​specific​ ​question​ ​could​ ​work​ ​tap​ ​into​ ​its​ ​existing​ ​general​ ​knowledge​ ​in​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to 
identify​ ​relevant​ ​causal​ ​factors;​ ​if​ ​it​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​generate​ ​them,​ ​it​ ​could​ ​look​ ​into​ ​existing​ ​disciplines 
which​ ​seemed​ ​relevant​ ​for​ ​the​ ​question.​ ​For​ ​each​ ​identified​ ​possibility,​ ​it​ ​could​ ​branch​ ​off​ ​a​ ​new 
subprocess​ ​to​ ​do​ ​research​ ​into​ ​that​ ​particular​ ​direction,​ ​sharing​ ​information​ ​as​ ​necessary​ ​with​ ​a 
main​ ​process​ ​whose​ ​purpose​ ​was​ ​to​ ​integrate​ ​the​ ​insights​ ​derived​ ​from​ ​all​ ​the​ ​relevant 
searches. 
 
Such​ ​a​ ​capability​ ​for​ ​several​ ​parallel​ ​streams​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​could​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​major​ ​advantage.​ ​A 
human​ ​researcher​ ​or​ ​forecaster​ ​who​ ​branches​ ​off​ ​to​ ​do​ ​research​ ​on​ ​a​ ​subquestion​ ​will​ ​need​ ​to 
make​ ​sure​ ​that​ ​they​ ​don’t​ ​lose​ ​track​ ​of​ ​the​ ​big​ ​picture,​ ​and​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​have​ ​an​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​whether 
they​ ​are​ ​making​ ​meaningful​ ​progress​ ​on​ ​that​ ​subquestion​ ​and​ ​whether​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​better​ ​to 
devote​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​something​ ​else​ ​instead.​ ​To​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​there​ ​can​ ​be​ ​several​ ​parallel 
streams​ ​of​ ​attention,​ ​these​ ​issues​ ​can​ ​be​ ​alleviated,​ ​with​ ​a​ ​main​ ​stream​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​overall 
question​ ​and​ ​substreams​ ​on​ ​specific​ ​subpossibilities. 
 
How​ ​much​ ​could​ ​this​ ​improve​ ​on​ ​human​ ​forecasters?​ ​Forecasters​ ​performed​ ​better​ ​when​ ​they 
were​ ​placed​ ​on​ ​teams​ ​where​ ​they​ ​shared​ ​information​ ​between​ ​each​ ​other,​ ​which​ ​similarly 
allowed​ ​an​ ​extent​ ​of​ ​parallelism​ ​in​ ​prediction-making,​ ​in​ ​that​ ​different​ ​forecasters​ ​could​ ​pursue 
their​ ​own​ ​angles​ ​and​ ​directions​ ​in​ ​exploring​ ​the​ ​problem.​ ​The​ ​differences​ ​between​ ​individual 
forecasters​ ​and​ ​teams​ ​of​ ​forecasters​ ​with​ ​comparable​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​training​ ​ranged​ ​between​ ​0.05 
and​ ​0.10​ ​Brier​ ​points​ ​at​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​first​ ​year,​ ​and​ ​between​ ​0.02​ ​and​ ​0.08​ ​Brier​ ​points​ ​at​ ​the 
end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​second​ ​year​ ​(​Mellers​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2014​).​ ​In​ ​humans​ ​however,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​likely​ ​that​ ​the​ ​extent 
of​ ​parallelism​ ​was​ ​constrained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​each​ ​forecaster​ ​had​ ​to​ ​independently​ ​familiarize 
themselves​ ​with​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​material,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​their​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​share​ ​knowledge​ ​between 
each​ ​other​ ​was​ ​limited​ ​by​ ​the​ ​speed​ ​of​ ​writing​ ​and​ ​reading.​ ​This​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​possibility​ ​for 
further​ ​improvement. 
 
In​ ​general,​ ​accurate​ ​forecasting​ ​requires​ ​an​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​out​ ​sophisticated​ ​causal​ ​modeling 
about​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​interacting​ ​factors.​ ​Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​emphasize​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​to​ ​which 
superforecaster​ ​forums​ ​discuss​ ​many​ ​different​ ​“on​ ​the​ ​one​ ​hand”/”on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand” 
possibilities.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia​ ​might​ ​agree​ ​to​ ​OPEC​ ​production​ ​cuts​ ​in 
November​ ​2014,​ ​one​ ​superforecaster​ ​noted​ ​that​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia​ ​had​ ​large​ ​financial​ ​reserves​ ​so 





























































could​ ​afford​ ​to​ ​let​ ​oil​ ​prices​ ​run​ ​low.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​he​ ​noted,​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​raise 
their​ ​social​ ​spending​ ​to​ ​bolster​ ​the​ ​support​ ​for​ ​the​ ​monarchy,​ ​but​ ​yet​ ​again,​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabian​ ​rulers 
might​ ​view​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​control​ ​oil​ ​prices​ ​as​ ​futile.​ ​The​ ​superforecaster​ ​in​ ​question 
concluded​ ​that​ ​the​ ​question​ ​“felt​ ​no-ish,​ ​80%”.​ ​(Saudis​ ​ended​ ​up​ ​not​ ​supporting​ ​production 
cuts.) 
 
This​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​AI​ ​with​ ​sufficient​ ​hardware​ ​capability​ ​could​ ​achieve​ ​considerable​ ​prediction 
ability​ ​by​ ​its​ ​capability​ ​to​ ​explore​ ​many​ ​different​ ​perspectives​ ​and​ ​causal​ ​factors​ ​at​ ​once.​ ​The 
simulations​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​be​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​around​ ​three​ ​causal​ ​factors​ ​and​ ​six​ ​transition​ ​states 
(Klein,​ ​1999).​ ​The​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​superforecasters​ ​clearly​ ​brought​ ​up​ ​many​ ​more 
possibilities,​ ​and​ ​their​ ​accuracy​ ​suggests​ ​moderate​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​integrate​ ​all​ ​those​ ​factors​ ​together. 
Yet​ ​comments​ ​such​ ​as​ ​'feels​ ​no-ish'​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​they​ ​still​ ​couldn’t​ ​construct​ ​a​ ​full-blown 
simulation​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​various​ ​causal​ ​factors​ ​would​ ​have​ ​influenced​ ​each​ ​other​ ​based​ ​on 
principled​ ​rules​ ​which​ ​could​ ​be​ ​inspected,​ ​evaluated,​ ​and​ ​revised​ ​based​ ​on​ ​feedback​ ​and 
accuracy.​ ​This​ ​seems​ ​especially​ ​plausible​ ​given​ ​that​ ​Klein​ ​speculates​ ​the​ ​limits​ ​in​ ​the​ ​size​ ​of 
human​ ​simulations​ ​to​ ​come​ ​from​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​limitations.  
 
AI​ ​systems​ ​with​ ​larger​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​capacities​ ​might​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​construct​ ​much​ ​more 
detailed​ ​simulations.​ ​Contemporary​ ​computer​ ​models​ ​can​ ​involve​ ​simulations​ ​with​ ​thousands​ ​or 
tens​ ​of​ ​thousands​ ​variables,​ ​though​ ​flexibly​ ​incorporating​ ​diverse​ ​models​ ​into​ ​a​ ​single 
simulation​ ​will​ ​probably​ ​take​ ​considerably​ ​more​ ​memory​ ​and​ ​computing​ ​power​ ​than​ ​what​ ​is 
used​ ​in​ ​today’s​ ​models. 
 
Example:​ ​parallel​ ​streams​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​with​ ​a​ ​LIDA-like​ ​architecture 
 
How​ ​could​ ​different​ ​streams​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​within​ ​AI​ ​share​ ​information​ ​between​ ​each​ ​other? 
Recall​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have​ ​defined​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​expertise​ ​as​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​accumulate 
patterns​ ​which​ ​are​ ​used​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​relevant​ ​cues​ ​and​ ​to​ ​indicate​ ​what​ ​predictions​ ​should​ ​be 
derived​ ​out​ ​of​ ​those.​ ​A​ ​computational​ ​model​ ​for​ ​attention​ ​and​ ​consciousness​ ​is​ ​Global 
Workspace​ ​Theory​ ​(Baars,​ ​​2002​;​ ​​2005​),​ ​of​ ​which​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​AI​ ​implementation​ ​is​ ​the​ ​LIDA 
model​ ​(​Franklin​ ​&​ ​Patterson,​ ​2006​;​ ​​Franklin,​ ​Madl,​ ​D’Mello,​ ​&​ ​Snaider,​ ​2014​;​ ​​Madl,​ ​Franklin, 
Chen,​ ​Montaldi,​ ​&​ ​Trappl,​ ​2016​).​ ​LIDA​ ​is​ ​a​ ​model​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mind​ ​that​ ​is​ ​inspired​ ​by​ ​psychological 
and​ ​neuroscientific​ ​research​ ​and​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​capture​ ​its​ ​main​ ​mechanisms.  
 
We​ ​can​ ​use​ ​LIDA​ ​to​ ​get​ ​a​ ​rough​ ​example​ ​of​ ​what​ ​having​ ​several​ ​'streams​ ​of​ ​attention'​ ​would 
mean,​ ​and​ ​how​ ​information​ ​could​ ​be​ ​exchanged​ ​between​ ​them.​ ​The​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​this​ ​example 
is​ ​not​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​an​ ​AI​ ​would​ ​necessarily​ ​work​ ​by​ ​this​ ​mechanism,​ ​but​ ​merely​ ​to​ ​make 
the​ ​speculation​ ​about​ ​streams​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​slightly​ ​more​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​existing​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​how​ ​a 
general​ ​intelligence​ ​(the​ ​human​ ​mind)​ ​might​ ​work.​ ​Thus,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​LIDA​ ​is​ ​correct​ ​as 
a​ ​model​ ​of​ ​human​ ​intelligence,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​the​ ​example​ ​in​ ​this​ ​box​ ​is​ ​correct​ ​about 
LIDA​ ​allowing​ ​for​ ​there​ ​to​ ​be​ ​several​ ​attentional​ ​streams​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time,​ ​this​ ​provides​ ​some 





























































information​ ​about​ ​it​ ​being​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​have​ ​several​ ​such​ ​streams​ ​in​ ​minds​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​and​ ​how 
that​ ​might​ ​concretely​ ​work. 
 
LIDA​ ​works​ ​by​ ​means​ ​of​ ​an​ ​understand-attend-act​ ​cycle.​ ​In​ ​each​ ​cycle,​ ​low-level​ ​sensory 
information​ ​is​ ​initially​ ​interpreted​ ​so​ ​as​ ​to​ ​associate​ ​it​ ​with​ ​higher-level​ ​concepts​ ​to​ ​form​ ​a 
'percept',​ ​which​ ​is​ ​then​ ​sent​ ​to​ ​a​ ​workspace.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​workspace,​ ​the​ ​percept​ ​activates​ ​further 
associations​ ​in​ ​other​ ​memory​ ​systems,​ ​which​ ​are​ ​combined​ ​with​ ​the​ ​percept​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a 
Current​ ​Situational​ ​Model,​ ​an​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​what​ ​is​ ​going​ ​on​ ​at​ ​this​ ​moment. 
 
The​ ​entirety​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Current​ ​Situational​ ​Model​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​too​ ​complex​ ​for​ ​the​ ​agent​ ​to 
process,​ ​so​ ​it​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​select​ ​a​ ​part​ ​of​ ​it​ ​to​ ​elevate​ ​to​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​conscious​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​be 
acted​ ​upon.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​using​ ​'attention​ ​codelets',​ ​small​ ​pieces​ ​of​ ​code​ ​that​ ​attempt​ ​to 
train​ ​attention​ ​on​ ​some​ ​particular​ ​piece​ ​of​ ​information,​ ​each​ ​with​ ​their​ ​own​ ​set​ ​of​ ​concerns​ ​of 
what​ ​is​ ​important.​ ​Attention​ ​codelets​ ​with​ ​matching​ ​concerns​ ​form​ ​coalitions​ ​of​ ​what​ ​to​ ​attend, 
competing​ ​against​ ​other​ ​coalitions.​ ​Whichever​ ​coalition​ ​ends​ ​up​ ​winning​ ​the​ ​competition​ ​will 
have​ ​its​ ​chosen​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Current​ ​Situational​ ​Model​ ​'become​ ​conscious',​ ​broadcast​ ​to​ ​the 
rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​system,​ ​and​ ​particularly​ ​Procedural​ ​Memory. 
 
The​ ​Procedural​ ​Memory​ ​holds​ ​schemes,​ ​or​ ​templates​ ​of​ ​different​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​taken​ ​in 
different​ ​contexts.​ ​Schemes​ ​which​ ​include​ ​a​ ​context​ ​or​ ​an​ ​action​ ​that​ ​matches​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of 
the​ ​conscious​ ​broadcast​ ​become​ ​available​ ​as​ ​candidates​ ​for​ ​possible​ ​actions.​ ​They​ ​are 
copied​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Action​ ​Selection​ ​mechanism,​ ​which​ ​chooses​ ​a​ ​single​ ​action​ ​to​ ​perform.​ ​The 
selected​ ​action​ ​is​ ​further​ ​sent​ ​to​ ​Sensory-Motor​ ​Memory,​ ​which​ ​contains​ ​information​ ​of​ ​how 
exactly​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action.​ ​The​ ​outcome​ ​of​ ​taking​ ​this​ ​action​ ​manifests​ ​itself​ ​as​ ​new 
sensory​ ​information,​ ​beginning​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​cycle​ ​anew. 
 
Here​ ​is​ ​a​ ​description​ ​of​ ​how​ ​this​ ​process​ ​–​ ​or​ ​something​ ​like​ ​it​ ​–​ ​might​ ​be​ ​applied​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case 
of​ ​AI​ ​seeking​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​outcome​ ​of​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​question,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​'will​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia 
agree​ ​to​ ​oil​ ​production​ ​cuts'​ ​question​ ​discussed​ ​above.​ ​The​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​this​ ​question 
has​ ​been​ ​made​ ​in​ ​an​ ​earlier​ ​cognitive​ ​cycle,​ ​and​ ​information​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​it​ ​is​ ​now​ ​available​ ​in 
the​ ​inner​ ​environment​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Current​ ​Situational​ ​Model.​ ​The​ ​concepts​ ​of​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia​ ​and 
oil​ ​production​ ​trigger​ ​several​ ​associations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​AI’s​ ​memory​ ​systems,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that 
oil​ ​prices​ ​will​ ​affect​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia’s​ ​financial​ ​situation,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​oil​ ​prices​ ​are​ ​also​ ​influenced​ ​by 
other​ ​factors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​global​ ​demand.​ ​Two​ ​coalitions​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​codelets​ ​might​ ​form,​ ​one 
focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​current​ ​financial​ ​situation​ ​and​ ​another​ ​on​ ​influences​ ​on​ ​oil​ ​prices. 
 
In​ ​LIDA,​ ​these​ ​codelets​ ​would​ ​normally​ ​compete,​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of​ ​them​ ​would​ ​win​ ​and​ ​trigger​ ​a 
specific​ ​action,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​a​ ​deeper​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​Saudi​ ​Arabia’s​ ​financial​ ​situation.​ ​In​ ​our 
hypothetical​ ​AI​ ​however,​ ​it​ ​might​ ​be​ ​enough​ ​that​ ​both​ ​coalitions​ ​manage​ ​to​ ​exceed​ ​some 
threshold​ ​level​ ​of​ ​success,​ ​indicating​ ​them​ ​both​ ​to​ ​be​ ​potentially​ ​relevant.​ ​In​ ​that​ ​case,​ ​new 
instances​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Procedural​ ​Memory,​ ​Action​ ​Selection​ ​and​ ​Sensory-Motor​ ​Memory 
mechanisms​ ​might​ ​be​ ​initialized,​ ​with​ ​one​ ​coalition​ ​sending​ ​its​ ​contents​ ​to​ ​the​ ​first​ ​set​ ​of 





























































instances​ ​and​ ​the​ ​other​ ​to​ ​another.​ ​These​ ​streams​ ​could​ ​then​ ​independently​ ​carry​ ​out 
searches​ ​of​ ​the​ ​information​ ​that​ ​was​ ​deemed​ ​relevant,​ ​also​ ​having​ ​their​ ​own​ ​local​ ​Situational 
Models​ ​and​ ​Workspaces​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​content​ ​relevant​ ​for​ ​this​ ​search.​ ​As​ ​they​ ​worked,​ ​these 
streams​ ​would​ ​update​ ​the​ ​various​ ​memory​ ​subsystems​ ​with​ ​the​ ​results​ ​of​ ​their​ ​learning, 
making​ ​new​ ​associations​ ​and​ ​attention​ ​codelets​ ​available​ ​to​ ​all​ ​attentional​ ​streams.​ ​Their 
functioning​ ​could​ ​be​ ​supervised​ ​by​ ​a​ ​general​ ​high-level​ ​attention​ ​stream,​ ​whose​ ​task​ ​was​ ​to 
evaluate​ ​the​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​various​ ​lower-level​ ​streams​ ​and​ ​allocate​ ​resources​ ​between 
them​ ​accordingly. 
 
These​ ​simulations​ ​do​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​need​ ​to​ ​incorporate​ ​an​ ​exponentially​ ​increasing​ ​number​ ​of 
variables​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​better​ ​prediction​ ​accuracy.​ ​As​ ​previously​ ​noted,​ ​superforecasters 
were​ ​more​ ​accurate​ ​at​ ​making​ ​predictions​ ​300​ ​days​ ​out​ ​than​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​forecasters​ ​in​ ​GJP 
were​ ​at​ ​making​ ​predictions​ ​100​ ​days​ ​out.​ ​Given​ ​that​ ​at​ ​least​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​superforecasters​ ​only 
used​ ​a​ ​few​ ​hours​ ​a​ ​day​ ​on​ ​making​ ​their​ ​predictions,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​they​ ​had​ ​many​ ​predictions​ ​to​ ​rate, 
they​ ​probably​ ​did​ ​not​ ​consider​ ​a​ ​​vastly​​ ​larger​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​factors​ ​than​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​forecasters. 
 
Klein​ ​(1999)​ ​offers​ ​an​ ​example​ ​of​ ​a​ ​professor​ ​who​ ​used​ ​​ ​three​ ​causal​ ​factors​ ​(the​ ​rate​ ​of 
inflation,​ ​the​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​unemployment,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​exchange)​ ​and​ ​a​ ​few​ ​transitions​ ​to 
relatively​ ​accurately​ ​simulate​ ​how​ ​the​ ​Polish​ ​economy​ ​would​ ​develop​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the 
decision​ ​to​ ​convert​ ​from​ ​socialism​ ​to​ ​a​ ​market​ ​economy.​ ​In​ ​contrast,​ ​less​ ​sophisticated​ ​experts 
could​ ​only​ ​name​ ​two​ ​variables​ ​(inflation​ ​and​ ​unemployment)​ ​and​ ​not​ ​develop​ ​any​ ​simulations​ ​at 
all,​ ​basing​ ​their​ ​predictions​ ​mostly​ ​on​ ​their​ ​ideological​ ​leanings. 
 
Having​ ​large​ ​explicit​ ​models​ ​also​ ​allows​ ​for​ ​the​ ​models​ ​to​ ​be​ ​adjusted​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​feedback. 
The​ ​professor’s​ ​estimate​ ​was​ ​in​ ​many​ ​extents​ ​correct,​ ​but​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​government 
being​ ​less​ ​ruthless​ ​and​ ​more​ ​cautious​ ​than​ ​it​ ​had​ ​said​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​closing​ ​down​ ​unproductive 
plants.​ ​The​ ​government’s​ ​caution​ ​could​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​added​ ​as​ ​an​ ​additional​ ​variable​ ​to​ ​be 
considered​ ​for​ ​the​ ​next​ ​model.​ ​The​ ​addition​ ​of​ ​this​ ​variable​ ​alone​ ​might​ ​then​ ​considerably 
increase​ ​the​ ​accuracy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​simulation. 
 
Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​report​ ​that​ ​the​ ​superforecasters​ ​used​ ​highly​ ​granular​ ​probability​ ​estimates​ ​– 
carefully​ ​thinking​ ​about​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​probability​ ​of​ ​an​ ​event​ ​was​ ​3%​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​4%,​ ​for 
instance​ ​–​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​granularity​ ​actually​ ​contributed​ ​to​ ​accuracy,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​predictions​ ​getting 
less​ ​accurate​ ​if​ ​they​ ​were​ ​rounded​ ​to​ ​the​ ​closest​ ​5%.​ ​Given​ ​that​ ​such​ ​granularity​ ​was​ ​achieved 
by​ ​integrating​ ​various​ ​possibilities​ ​and​ ​considerations,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​an​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​and 
integrate​ ​an​ ​even​ ​larger​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​possibilities​ ​might​ ​provide​ ​even​ ​increased​ ​granularity,​ ​and 
thus​ ​a​ ​prediction​ ​edge. 
 
In​ ​summary,​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​run​ ​vastly​ ​larger​ ​simulations​ ​than​ ​humans​ ​could,​ ​with​ ​this 
possibility​ ​being​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​computing​ ​power​ ​limitations;​ ​given​ ​this,​ ​its​ ​simulations​ ​could​ ​also​ ​be 
explicit,​ ​allowing​ ​it​ ​to​ ​adjust​ ​and​ ​correct​ ​them​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​feedback​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​improved 
prediction​ ​accuracy;​ ​and​ ​it​ ​could​ ​have​ ​several​ ​streams​ ​of​ ​attention​ ​running​ ​concurrently​ ​and 





























































sharing​ ​information​ ​between​ ​each​ ​other.​ ​Existing​ ​evidence​ ​from​ ​human​ ​experts​ ​suggests​ ​that 
large​ ​increases​ ​to​ ​prediction​ ​capability​ ​might​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​need​ ​a​ ​large​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​the 
number​ ​of​ ​variables​ ​considered,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​even​ ​small​ ​increases​ ​can​ ​provide​ ​considerable 
additional​ ​gains.  
 
The​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​predictive​ ​edge​ ​that​ ​this​ ​could​ ​give​ ​to​ ​an​ ​AI​ ​as​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​a​ ​human​ ​or​ ​a​ ​group 
of​ ​humans​ ​is​ ​unclear,​ ​but​ ​humans​ ​do​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​prefer​ ​simple​ ​stories​ ​and​ ​explanations​ ​that​ ​are 
compact​ ​enough​ ​that​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the​ ​important​ ​details​ ​can​ ​be​ ​kept​ ​in​ ​mind​ ​at​ ​once.​ ​Simple​ ​hypotheses 
often​ ​turn​ ​out​ ​to​ ​be​ ​insufficient​ ​because​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is​ ​more​ ​complicated​ ​than​ ​a​ ​simple​ ​hypothesis 
allows​ ​for.​ ​Even​ ​in​ ​domains​ ​such​ ​as​ ​engineering,​ ​where​ ​there​ ​exist​ ​formal​ ​ways​ ​of​ ​modeling​ ​the 
entire​ ​domain,​ ​a​ ​task​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​design​ ​of​ ​a​ ​modern​ ​airplane​ ​or​ ​operating​ ​system​ ​contains​ ​too 
much​ ​complexity​ ​for​ ​a​ ​single​ ​person​ ​to​ ​comprehend.​ ​While​ ​the​ ​impact​ ​of​ ​uncertainty​ ​can​ ​never 
be​ ​eliminated,​ ​being​ ​able​ ​to​ ​take​ ​more​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world’s​ ​underlying​ ​complexity​ ​into​ ​account​ ​than 
humans​ ​do,​ ​may​ ​provide​ ​an​ ​AI​ ​with​ ​a​ ​predictive​ ​edge​ ​at​ ​least​ ​in​ ​some​ ​domains. 
Rate​ ​of​ ​capability​ ​growth 
How​ ​fast​ ​could​ ​AI​ ​develop​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​run​ ​comprehensive​ ​and​ ​large​ ​simulations? ​ ​Creating 6
larger​ ​simulations​ ​than​ ​humans​ ​have​ ​access​ ​to​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​require​ ​extensive​ ​computational 
resources,​ ​either​ ​from​ ​hardware​ ​or​ ​optimized​ ​software.​ ​As​ ​an​ ​additional​ ​consideration,​ ​we​ ​have 
previously​ ​mentioned​ ​limited​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​restricting​ ​the​ ​capabilities​ ​of​ ​humans,​ ​but​ ​human 
working​ ​memory​ ​is​ ​​not​​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​as​ ​RAM​ ​in​ ​computer​ ​systems.​ ​If​ ​one​ ​were​ ​running​ ​a 
simulation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​brain​ ​in​ ​a​ ​computer,​ ​one​ ​could​ ​not​ ​increase​ ​the​ ​brain’s​ ​available 
working​ ​memory​ ​simply​ ​by​ ​increasing​ ​the​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​RAM​ ​the​ ​simulation​ ​had​ ​access​ ​to.​ ​Rather, 
it​ ​has​ ​been​ ​hypothesized​ ​that​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​differences​ ​between​ ​individuals​ ​may​ ​reflect 
things​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​discriminate​ ​between​ ​relevant​ ​and​ ​irrelevant​ ​information​ ​(​Unsworth 
&​ ​Engle,​ ​2007​),​ ​which​ ​could​ ​be​ ​related​ ​to​ ​things​ ​like​ ​brain​ ​network​ ​structure​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​more 
of​ ​a​ ​software​ ​than​ ​a​ ​hardware​ ​issue. ​ ​​Yudkowsky​ ​(2013)​​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​if​ ​increased​ ​intelligence 7
would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​simple​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​scaling​ ​up​ ​the​ ​brain,​ ​the​ ​road​ ​from​ ​chimpanzees​ ​to​ ​humans​ ​would 
likely​ ​have​ ​been​ ​much​ ​shorter,​ ​as​ ​simple​ ​factors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​brain​ ​size​ ​can​ ​respond​ ​rapidly​ ​to 
evolutionary​ ​selection​ ​pressure. 
 
Thus,​ ​advances​ ​in​ ​simulation​ ​size​ ​depend​ ​on​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​both​ ​hardware​ ​and​ ​algorithms. 
Hardware​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​predict,​ ​but​ ​advances​ ​in​ ​algorithmic​ ​capabilities​ ​seem​ ​doable 
using​ ​mostly​ ​theoretical​ ​and​ ​mathematical​ ​research.​ ​This​ ​would​ ​require​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of 
expertise​ ​in​ ​mathematics,​ ​programming,​ ​and​ ​theoretical​ ​computer​ ​science. 
 
6 ​ ​This​ ​section​ ​does​ ​not​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​fast​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​develop​ ​the​ ​necessary​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​to 
be​ ​used​ ​in​ ​the​ ​simulations.​ ​That​ ​question​ ​will​ ​be​ ​discussed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​next​ ​section. 
7 ​ ​Though​ ​it​ ​is​ ​worth​ ​noting​ ​that​ ​​g​​ ​does​ ​correlate​ ​to​ ​some​ ​extent​ ​with​ ​brain​ ​size,​ ​with​ ​a​ ​mean​ ​correlation​ ​of 
0.4​ ​in​ ​measurements​ ​that​ ​are​ ​obtained​ ​using​ ​brain​ ​imaging​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​external​ ​measurements​ ​of 
brain​ ​size​ ​(​Rushton​ ​&​ ​Ankney,​ ​2009​).​ ​This​ ​would​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​the​ ​raw​ ​number​ ​of​ ​neurons​ ​and 
thus​ ​'general​ ​hardware​ ​capacity'​ ​would​ ​also​ ​be​ ​relevant. 





























































Much​ ​of​ ​mathematical​ ​problem-solving​ ​is​ ​about​ ​having​ ​a​ ​library​ ​of​ ​procedures,​ ​reformulations, 
and​ ​heuristics​ ​that​ ​one​ ​can​ ​try​ ​(​Polya,​ ​1990​),​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​developing​ ​a​ ​familiarity​ ​and 
understanding​ ​of​ ​many​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​mathematical​ ​results,​ ​which​ ​one​ ​may​ ​then​ ​later​ ​on​ ​recognize​ ​as 
relevant.​ ​This​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​the​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​task​ ​that​ ​relies​ ​strongly​ ​on​ ​pattern-matching​ ​abilities,​ ​and 
might​ ​in​ ​principle​ ​be​ ​in​ ​reach​ ​by​ ​an​ ​advanced​ ​deep​ ​reinforcement​ ​learning​ ​system​ ​that​ ​was​ ​fed 
a​ ​sufficiently​ ​large​ ​library​ ​of​ ​heuristics​ ​and​ ​worked​ ​proofs​ ​to​ ​let​ ​it​ ​develop​ ​superhuman 
mathematical​ ​intuition .​ ​Modern-day​ ​theorem​ ​provers​ ​often​ ​know​ ​what​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​steps​ ​are​ ​valid, 8
but​ ​not​ ​which​ ​steps​ ​are​ ​worth​ ​taking;​ ​merging​ ​them​ ​with​ ​the​ ​'artificial​ ​intuition'​ ​of​ ​deep 
reinforcement​ ​learning​ ​systems​ ​might​ ​eventually​ ​produce​ ​systems​ ​with​ ​superhuman 
mathematical​ ​ability. 
 
Progress​ ​in​ ​this​ ​field​ ​could​ ​allow​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​superhuman​ ​abilities​ ​in​ ​math​ ​research, 
considerably​ ​increasing​ ​their​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​more​ ​optimized​ ​software​ ​to​ ​take​ ​full​ ​advantage​ ​of 
the​ ​available​ ​hardware.​ ​To​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​relatively​ ​small​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of​ ​variables 
considered​ ​in​ ​a​ ​high-level​ ​simulation​ ​would​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​dramatically​ ​increased​ ​prediction​ ​ability​ ​(as 
is​ ​suggested​ ​by​ ​e.g.​ ​the​ ​superforecasters​ ​being​ ​better​ ​predictors​ ​with​ ​thrice​ ​the​ ​prediction 
horizon​ ​of​ ​less​ ​accurate​ ​forecasters),​ ​moderate​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​the​ ​size​ ​of​ ​the​ ​AI’s​ ​simulations 
could​ ​translate​ ​to​ ​drastic​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​real-world​ ​capability.  
 
Yudkowsky​ ​(2013)​​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​although​ ​the​ ​evolutionary​ ​record​ ​strongly​ ​suggests​ ​that 
algorithmic​ ​improvements​ ​were​ ​needed​ ​for​ ​taking​ ​us​ ​from​ ​chimpanzees​ ​to​ ​humans,​ ​the​ ​record 
rules​ ​out​ ​exponentially​ ​increasing​ ​hardware​ ​always​ ​being​ ​needed​ ​for​ ​linear​ ​cognitive​ ​gains:​ ​the 
size​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​brain​ ​is​ ​only​ ​four​ ​times​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the​ ​chimpanzee​ ​brain.​ ​This​ ​further​ ​suggests 
that​ ​relatively​ ​limited​ ​improvements​ ​could​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​drastic​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​intelligence. 
Pattern​ ​recognition 
The​ ​capability​ ​to​ ​run​ ​large​ ​simulations​ ​isn’t​ ​enough​ ​by​ ​itself.​ ​The​ ​AI​ ​also​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​acquire​ ​a 
sufficiently​ ​large​ ​number​ ​of​ ​patterns​ ​to​ ​be​ ​included​ ​in​ ​the​ ​simulations,​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​how​ ​different 
pieces​ ​in​ ​the​ ​simulation​ ​behave. 
Potential​ ​capability 
When​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​well-defined​ ​tasks,​ ​current​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​excel​ ​at​ ​pattern​ ​recognition,​ ​being​ ​able 
to​ ​analyze​ ​vast​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​data​ ​and​ ​build​ ​them​ ​into​ ​an​ ​overall​ ​model,​ ​finding​ ​regularities​ ​that 
human​ ​experts​ ​never​ ​would​ ​have.​ ​For​ ​instance,​ ​human​ ​experts​ ​would​ ​likely​ ​have​ ​been​ ​unable 
to​ ​anticipate​ ​that​ ​men​ ​who​ ​'like'​ ​the​ ​Facebook​ ​page​ ​'Being​ ​Confused​ ​After​ ​Waking​ ​Up​ ​From 
Naps'​ ​are​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​heterosexual​ ​(​Kosinski,​ ​Stillwell,​ ​&​ ​Graepel,​ ​2013​).​ ​Similarly,​ ​the 
Go-playing​ ​AI​ ​AlphaGo,​ ​whose​ ​good​ ​performance​ ​against​ ​the​ ​expert​ ​player​ ​Lee​ ​Sedol​ ​could​ ​to 
a​ ​large​ ​extent​ ​be​ ​attributed​ ​to​ ​its​ ​built-up​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​board​ ​patterns​ ​that 
8 ​ ​See​ ​​Whalen​​ ​​(2016)​​ ​for​ ​preliminary​ ​work​ ​in​ ​this​ ​direction. 





























































predict​ ​victory,​ ​managed​ ​to​ ​make​ ​moves​ ​that​ ​Go​ ​professionals​ ​watching​ ​the​ ​game​ ​considered 
creative​ ​and​ ​novel. 
 
The​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​find​ ​subtle​ ​patterns​ ​in​ ​data​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​might​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​make 
predictions​ ​in​ ​domains​ ​which​ ​humans​ ​currently​ ​consider​ ​impossible​ ​to​ ​predict.​ ​We​ ​previously 
discussed​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​(predictive)​ ​​validity​​ ​of​ ​a​ ​domain,​ ​with​ ​domains​ ​being​ ​said​ ​to​ ​have 
higher​ ​validity​ ​if​ ​'there​ ​are​ ​stable​ ​relationships​ ​between​ ​objectively​ ​identifiable​ ​cues​ ​and 
subsequent​ ​events​ ​or​ ​between​ ​cues​ ​and​ ​the​ ​outcomes​ ​of​ ​possible​ ​actions'​ ​(​Kahneman​ ​&​ ​Klein, 
2009​).​ ​A​ ​field​ ​could​ ​also​ ​be​ ​valid​ ​despite​ ​being​ ​substantially​ ​uncertain,​ ​with​ ​warfare​ ​and​ ​poker 
being​ ​listed​ ​as​ ​examples​ ​of​ ​fields​ ​that​ ​were​ ​valid​ ​(letting​ ​a​ ​skilled​ ​actor​ ​improve​ ​their​ ​average 
performance)​ ​despite​ ​also​ ​being​ ​highly​ ​uncertain​ ​(with​ ​good​ ​performance​ ​not​ ​being​ ​guaranteed 
even​ ​for​ ​a​ ​skilled​ ​actor). 
 
We​ ​already​ ​know​ ​that​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​field​ ​also​ ​depends​ ​on​ ​an​ ​actor’s​ ​cognitive​ ​and 
technological​ ​abilities.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​weather​ ​forecasting​ ​used​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​field​ ​in​ ​which​ ​almost​ ​no 
objectively​ ​identifiable​ ​cues​ ​were​ ​available,​ ​relying​ ​mostly​ ​on​ ​guesswork​ ​and​ ​intuition,​ ​but​ ​the 
development​ ​of​ ​modern​ ​meteorological​ ​theory​ ​made​ ​it​ ​a​ ​much​ ​more​ ​valid​ ​field​ ​(​Shanteau, 
1992​).​ ​Thus,​ ​even​ ​fields​ ​which​ ​have​ ​low​ ​validity​ ​to​ ​humans​ ​with​ ​modern-day​ ​capabilities,​ ​could 
become​ ​more​ ​valid​ ​for​ ​more​ ​advanced​ ​actors. 
 
A​ ​possible​ ​example​ ​of​ ​a​ ​domain​ ​that​ ​is​ ​currently​ ​relatively​ ​low-validity,​ ​but​ ​which​ ​could​ ​become 
substantially​ ​more​ ​valid,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​of​ ​predicting​ ​the​ ​behavior​ ​of​ ​individual​ ​humans.​ ​Machine 
learning​ ​tools​ ​can​ ​already​ ​generate​ ​personality​ ​profiles​ ​harvested​ ​from​ ​people’s​ ​Facebook​ ​'likes' 
that​ ​are​ ​slightly​ ​more​ ​accurate​ ​than​ ​the​ ​profiles​ ​made​ ​by​ ​people’s​ ​human​ ​friends​ ​(​Youyou​ ​et​ ​al. 
2015​),​ ​and​ ​can​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​private​ ​traits​ ​such​ ​as​ ​sexual​ ​orientation​ ​(​Kosinski​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2013​). 
This​ ​has​ ​been​ ​achieved​ ​using​ ​a​ ​relatively​ ​limited​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​data​ ​and​ ​not​ ​much​ ​intelligence;​ ​a 
more​ ​sophisticated​ ​modeling​ ​process​ ​could​ ​probably​ ​make​ ​even​ ​better​ ​predictions​ ​from​ ​the 
same​ ​data. 
 
Taleb​ ​(2007)​ ​has​ ​argued​ ​for​ ​history​ ​being​ ​strongly​ ​driven​ ​by​ ​'black​ ​swan'​ ​events,​ ​events​ ​with 
such​ ​a​ ​low​ ​probability​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​unanticipated​ ​and​ ​unprepared​ ​for,​ ​but​ ​which​ ​have​ ​an 
enormous​ ​impact​ ​on​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​To​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​accurate,​ ​it​ ​suggests​ ​limits​ ​on​ ​the 
validity​ ​of​ ​prediction.​ ​However,​ ​Tetlock​ ​&​ ​Gardner​ ​(2015)​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​while​ ​the​ ​black​ ​swans 
themselves​ ​may​ ​be​ ​unanticipated,​ ​once​ ​the​ ​event​ ​has​ ​happened​ ​its​ ​consequences​ ​may​ ​be 
much​ ​easier​ ​to​ ​predict.​ ​Although​ ​superforecasters​ ​have​ ​shown​ ​no​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​black​ ​swans 
such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​9/11​ ​terrorist​ ​attacks,​ ​they​ ​could​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​answers​ ​to​ ​questions​ ​like​ ​“Will​ ​the 
United​ ​States​ ​threaten​ ​military​ ​action​ ​if​ ​the​ ​Taliban​ ​don’t​ ​hand​ ​over​ ​Osama​ ​bin​ ​Laden?”​ ​and 
“Will​ ​the​ ​Taliban​ ​comply?”. 
 
Thus,​ ​even​ ​though​ ​AI​ ​might​ ​be​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​some​ ​very​ ​rare​ ​events,​ ​once​ ​those​ ​events 
have​ ​happened,​ ​it​ ​could​ ​utilize​ ​its​ ​built-up​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​how​ ​people​ ​typically​ ​react​ ​to​ ​different 
events​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​consequences​ ​better​ ​than​ ​anyone​ ​else. 





























































Rates​ ​of​ ​capability​ ​growth 
How​ ​quickly​ ​could​ ​AI​ ​acquire​ ​more​ ​detailed​ ​models?​ ​Here​ ​again​ ​opinions​ ​differ.​ ​Hibbard​ ​(​2016​) 
argues,​ ​based​ ​on​ ​Mahoney’s​ ​(​2008​)​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​intelligence​ ​being​ ​a​ ​function​ ​of​ ​both 
resources​ ​and​ ​knowledge,​ ​that​ ​explosive​ ​growth​ ​is​ ​unlikely.​ ​Benthall​ ​(2017)​ ​makes​ ​a​ ​similar 
argument.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​authors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Bostrom​ ​(2014)​ ​and​ ​Yudkowsky​ ​(2008)​ ​suggest 
the​ ​possibility​ ​for​ ​fast​ ​increases. 
How​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​learning​ ​speed? 
We​ ​know​ ​that​ ​among​ ​humans,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​considerable​ ​differences​ ​in​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​to​ ​which​ ​people 
learn.​ ​Human​ ​cognitive​ ​differences​ ​have​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​neural​ ​and​ ​genetic​ ​basis​ ​(​Deary,​ ​Penke,​ ​& 
Johnson,​ ​2010​),​ ​and​ ​strongly​ ​predict​ ​academic​ ​performance​ ​(​Deary​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2007​), 
socio-economic​ ​outcomes​ ​(​Strenze,​ ​2007​),​ ​and​ ​job​ ​performance​ ​and​ ​the​ ​effectiveness​ ​of 
on-the-job​ ​learning​ ​and​ ​experience​ ​(​Gottfredson,​ ​1997​b).​ ​There​ ​also​ ​exist​ ​child​ ​prodigies​ ​who 
before​ ​adolescence​ ​achieve​ ​a​ ​level​ ​of​ ​performance​ ​comparable​ ​to​ ​an​ ​adult​ ​professional,​ ​without 
having​ ​been​ ​able​ ​to​ ​spend​ ​comparable​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​time​ ​training​ ​(​Ruthsatz,​ ​Ruthsatz,​ ​& 
Stephens,​ ​2013​).​ ​In​ ​general,​ ​some​ ​people​ ​are​ ​able​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​faster​ ​from​ ​the​ ​same​ ​experiences, 
notice​ ​relevant​ ​patterns​ ​faster,​ ​and​ ​continue​ ​learning​ ​from​ ​experience​ ​even​ ​past​ ​the​ ​point​ ​where 
others​ ​cease​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​additional​ ​gains.  9
 
While​ ​there​ ​is​ ​so​ ​far​ ​no​ ​clear​ ​consensus​ ​on​ ​why​ ​some​ ​people​ ​learn​ ​faster​ ​than​ ​others,​ ​there​ ​are 
some​ ​clear​ ​clues.​ ​Individual​ ​differences​ ​in​ ​cognitive​ ​abilities​ ​may​ ​be​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​differences​ ​in​ ​a 
9 ​ ​Readers​ ​who​ ​are​ ​familiar​ ​with​ ​the​ ​'deliberate​ ​practice'​ ​literature​ ​may​ ​wonder​ ​if​ ​that​ ​literature​ ​might​ ​not 
contradict​ ​these​ ​claims​ ​about​ ​the​ ​impact​ ​of​ ​intelligence.​ ​After​ ​all,​ ​the​ ​deliberate​ ​practice​ ​research 
suggests​ ​that​ ​talent​ ​is​ ​irrelevant,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​deliberate,​ ​well-supervised​ ​training​ ​is​ ​the​ ​only​ ​thing​ ​that 
matters.  
 
However,​ ​as​ ​noted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​field’s​ ​inventor,​ ​deliberate​ ​practice​ ​is​ ​a​ ​concept​ ​that​ ​is​ ​applicable​ ​to​ ​some​ ​very 
specific​ ​–​ ​one​ ​might​ ​even​ ​say​ ​artificial​ ​–​ ​domains.​ ​Deliberate​ ​practice​ ​can​ ​only​ ​be​ ​applied​ ​in​ ​fields​ ​in 
which​ ​there​ ​are​ ​objective​ ​metrics,​ ​highly​ ​developed​ ​objectively-measurable​ ​expertise,​ ​and​ ​active 
competition​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​the​ ​existing​ ​practices.​ ​Areas​ ​that​ ​don’t​ ​qualify​ ​are​ ​“​anything​ ​in​ ​which​ ​there​ ​is​ ​little 
or​ ​no​ ​direct​ ​competition,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​gardening​ ​and​ ​other​ ​hobbies,​ ​for​ ​instance,​ ​and​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​jobs​ ​in 
today’s​ ​workplace—​ ​business​ ​manager,​ ​teacher,​ ​electrician,​ ​engineer,​ ​consultant,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on​”,​ ​as​ ​there 
are​ ​no​ ​objective​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​performance​ ​(Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool​ ​2016). 
 
Fields​ ​that​ ​have​ ​well-defined,​ ​objective​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​good​ ​performance​ ​are​ ​ones​ ​which​ ​are​ ​the​ ​easiest​ ​to 
master​ ​using​ ​even​ ​current-day​ ​AI​ ​methods​ ​–​ ​in​ ​fact,​ ​they’re​ ​basically​ ​the​ ​only​ ​ones​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​truly 
mastered​ ​using​ ​current-day​ ​AI​ ​methods. 
 
A​ ​somewhat​ ​cheeky​ ​way​ ​to​ ​summarize​ ​these​ ​results​ ​would​ ​be​ ​by​ ​saying​ ​that,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​fields​ ​that 
could​ ​be​ ​mastered​ ​by​ ​AI​ ​methods​ ​that​ ​exhibit​ ​no​ ​general​ ​intelligence,​ ​general​ ​intelligence​ ​isn’t​ ​the​ ​most 
important​ ​thing.​ ​This​ ​even​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​Ericsson’s​ ​own​ ​theoretical​ ​stance:​ ​that​ ​in​ ​these​ ​fields,​ ​general 
intelligence​ ​eventually​ ​ceases​ ​to​ ​matter​ ​because​ ​the​ ​expert​ ​will​ ​have​ ​developed​ ​specialized​ ​mental 
representations​ ​that​ ​they​ ​can​ ​just​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​in​ ​every​ ​situation.​ ​So​ ​these​ ​results​ ​are​ ​not​ ​very​ ​interesting​ ​to 
those​ ​of​ ​us​ ​who​ ​are​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​domains​ ​that​ ​​do​​ ​require​ ​general​ ​intelligence. 
 





























































combination​ ​of​ ​factors,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​capacity,​ ​attention​ ​control,​ ​and​ ​long-term 
memory​ ​(​Unsworth​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2014​).​ ​Ruthsatz​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​(​2013​),​ ​in​ ​turn,​ ​note​ ​that​ ​'​child​ ​prodigies'​ ​skills 
are​ ​highly​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​a​ ​few​ ​features​ ​of​ ​their​ ​cognitive​ ​profiles,​ ​including​ ​elevated​ ​general 
IQs,​ ​exceptional​ ​working​ ​memories,​ ​and​ ​elevated​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​detail​'.  
 
Many​ ​tasks​ ​require​ ​paying​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​many​ ​things​ ​at​ ​once,​ ​with​ ​a​ ​risk​ ​of​ ​overloading​ ​the 
learner’s​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​before​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​performance​ ​has​ ​been​ ​automated.​ ​For​ ​an 
example,​ ​McPherson​ ​&​ ​Renwick​ ​(​2001​)​ ​consider​ ​children​ ​who​ ​are​ ​learning​ ​to​ ​play​ ​instruments, 
and​ ​note​ ​that​ ​children​ ​who​ ​had​ ​previously​ ​learned​ ​to​ ​play​ ​another​ ​instrument​ ​were​ ​faster 
learners.​ ​They​ ​suggest​ ​this​ ​to​ ​be​ ​in​ ​part​ ​because​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​reading​ ​musical​ ​notation​ ​had 
become​ ​automated​ ​for​ ​these​ ​children,​ ​saving​ ​them​ ​from​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​process​ ​notation​ ​in​ ​working 
memory​ ​and​ ​allowing​ ​them​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​entirely​ ​on​ ​learning​ ​the​ ​actual​ ​instrument. 
 
This​ ​general​ ​phenomenon​ ​has​ ​been​ ​recognized​ ​in​ ​education​ ​research.​ ​Complex​ ​activities​ ​that 
require​ ​multiple​ ​subskills​ ​can​ ​be​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​master​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​students​ ​have​ ​moderate​ ​competence 
in​ ​each​ ​individual​ ​subskill,​ ​as​ ​using​ ​several​ ​of​ ​them​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time​ ​can​ ​produce​ ​an 
overwhelming​ ​cognitive​ ​load​ ​(​Ambrose​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2010,​ ​chap.​ ​4​).​ ​Recommended​ ​strategies​ ​for 
dealing​ ​with​ ​this​ ​include​ ​reducing​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​at​ ​first​ ​and​ ​then​ ​building​ ​up​ ​to 
increasingly​ ​complex​ ​scopes.​ ​For​ ​instance,​ ​'​a​ ​piano​ ​teacher​ ​might​ ​ask​ ​students​ ​to​ ​practice​ ​only 
the​ ​right​ ​hand​ ​part​ ​of​ ​a​ ​piece,​ ​and​ ​then​ ​only​ ​the​ ​left​ ​hand​ ​part,​ ​before​ ​combining​ ​them​'​ ​(ibid). 
 
An​ ​increased​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​capacity,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​empirically​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​faster​ ​learning 
capabilities,​ ​could​ ​theoretically​ ​assist​ ​in​ ​learning​ ​in​ ​allowing​ ​more​ ​things​ ​to​ ​be​ ​comprehended 
simultaneously​ ​without​ ​them​ ​overwhelming​ ​the​ ​learner.​ ​Thus,​ ​AI​ ​with​ ​a​ ​large​ ​working​ ​memory 
could​ ​learn​ ​and​ ​master​ ​at​ ​once​ ​much​ ​more​ ​complicated​ ​wholes​ ​than​ ​humans.  
 
Additionally,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​seen​ ​that​ ​a​ ​key​ ​part​ ​of​ ​efficient​ ​learning​ ​is​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​monitor​ ​one’s​ ​own 
performance​ ​and​ ​to​ ​notice​ ​errors​ ​which​ ​need​ ​correcting;​ ​this​ ​seems​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​cognitive 
abilities​ ​correlating​ ​with​ ​attentional​ ​control​ ​and​ ​elevated​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​detail.​ ​McPherson​ ​& 
Renwick​ ​(​2001​)​ ​also​ ​remark​ ​on​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​of​ ​some​ ​students​ ​to​ ​play​ ​through​ ​a​ ​piece​ ​with 
considerably​ ​fewer​ ​errors​ ​on​ ​their​ ​second​ ​run-through​ ​than​ ​the​ ​first​ ​one,​ ​suggesting​ ​that​ ​this 
indicates​ ​'​an​ ​outstanding​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​retain​ ​a​ ​mental​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​[...]​ ​performance​ ​between 
run-throughs,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​use​ ​this​ ​as​ ​a​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​learning​ ​from​ ​[...]​ ​errors​'.​ ​In​ ​contrast,​ ​children​ ​who 
learned​ ​more​ ​slowly​ ​seemed​ ​to​ ​either​ ​not​ ​notice​ ​their​ ​mistakes,​ ​or​ ​alternatively​ ​to​ ​not​ ​remember 
them​ ​when​ ​they​ ​played​ ​the​ ​piece​ ​again. 
 
Whatever​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​analogues​ ​of​ ​working​ ​and​ ​long-term​ ​memory,​ ​attentional​ ​control,​ ​and​ ​attention 
to​ ​detail​ ​are,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​at​ ​least​ ​plausible​ ​that​ ​these​ ​could​ ​be​ ​improved​ ​upon​ ​by​ ​drawing 
exclusively​ ​on​ ​relatively​ ​theoretical​ ​research​ ​and​ ​in-house​ ​experiments.​ ​This​ ​might​ ​enable​ ​AI​ ​to 
both​ ​absorb​ ​vast​ ​datasets,​ ​as​ ​current-day​ ​deep​ ​learning​ ​systems​ ​do,​ ​​and​​ ​also​ ​learn​ ​from 
superhumanly​ ​small​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​data. 





























































Limits​ ​of​ ​learning​ ​speed 
How​ ​much​ ​can​ ​the​ ​human​ ​learning​ ​speed​ ​be​ ​improved​ ​upon?​ ​This​ ​remains​ ​an​ ​open​ ​question. 
There​ ​are​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​sharply​ ​diminishing​ ​returns​ ​at​ ​some​ ​point,​ ​but​ ​we​ ​do​ ​not​ ​know​ ​whether 
they​ ​are​ ​near​ ​the​ ​human​ ​level.​ ​Human​ ​intelligence​ ​seems​ ​constrained​ ​by​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​biological 
and​ ​physical​ ​factors​ ​that​ ​are​ ​unrelated​ ​to​ ​gains​ ​from​ ​intelligence.​ ​Plausible​ ​constraints​ ​include 
the​ ​size​ ​of​ ​the​ ​birth​ ​canal​ ​limiting​ ​the​ ​volume​ ​of​ ​human​ ​brains,​ ​the​ ​brain’s​ ​extensive​ ​energy 
requirements​ ​limiting​ ​the​ ​overall​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​cells,​ ​limits​ ​to​ ​the​ ​speed​ ​of​ ​signaling​ ​in​ ​neurons,​ ​an 
increasing​ ​proportion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​brain’s​ ​volume​ ​being​ ​spent​ ​on​ ​wiring​ ​and​ ​connections​ ​(rather​ ​than 
actual​ ​computation)​ ​as​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of​ ​neurons​ ​grows,​ ​and​ ​inherent​ ​unreliabilities​ ​in​ ​the 
operation​ ​of​ ​ion​ ​channels​ ​(​Fox,​ ​2011​).​ ​There​ ​doesn’t​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​be​ ​any​ ​obvious​ ​reason​ ​for​ ​why 
the​ ​threshold​ ​for​ ​diminishing​ ​gains​ ​from​ ​intelligence​ ​to​ ​learning​ ​speed​ ​would​ ​just​ ​happen​ ​to 
coincide​ ​with​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​intelligence​ ​allowed​ ​by​ ​our​ ​current​ ​biology.​ ​Alternatively,​ ​there​ ​could 
have​ ​been​ ​diminishing​ ​returns​ ​all​ ​along,​ ​but​ ​ones​ ​which​ ​still​ ​made​ ​it​ ​worthwhile​ ​for​ ​evolution​ ​to 
keep​ ​investing​ ​in​ ​additional​ ​intelligence. 
 
The​ ​available​ ​evidence​ ​also​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​within​ ​the​ ​human​ ​range​ ​at​ ​least,​ ​increased 
intelligence​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​additional​ ​gains.​ ​The​ ​Study​ ​of​ ​Mathematically​ ​Precocious 
Youth​ ​(SMPY)​ ​is​ ​a​ ​50-year​ ​longitudinal​ ​study​ ​involving​ ​over​ ​5,000​ ​exceptionally​ ​talented 
individuals​ ​identified​ ​between​ ​1972​ ​and​ ​1997.​ ​Despite​ ​its​ ​name,​ ​many​ ​its​ ​participants​ ​are​ ​more 
verbally​ ​than​ ​mathematically​ ​talented.​ ​The​ ​study​ ​has​ ​led​ ​to​ ​several​ ​publications;​ ​among​ ​others, 
Wai​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​(2005)​ ​and​ ​Lubinski​ ​&​ ​Benbow​ ​(2006)​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​ability 
differences​ ​within​ ​the​ ​top​ ​1%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​population​ ​make​ ​a​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​life.  
 
Comparing​ ​the​ ​top​ ​(Q4)​ ​and​ ​bottom​ ​(Q1)​ ​quartiles​ ​of​ ​two​ ​cohorts​ ​within​ ​this​ ​study​ ​shows​ ​both​ ​to 
significantly​ ​differ​ ​from​ ​the​ ​ordinary​ ​population,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​from​ ​each​ ​other.​ ​Out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​general 
population,​ ​about​ ​1%​ ​will​ ​obtain​ ​a​ ​doctoral​ ​degree,​ ​whereas​ ​20%​ ​of​ ​Q1​ ​and​ ​32%​ ​of​ ​Q4​ ​did. 
0.4%​ ​of​ ​Q1​ ​achieved​ ​tenure​ ​at​ ​a​ ​top-50​ ​US​ ​university,​ ​as​ ​did​ ​3%​ ​of​ ​Q4.​ ​Looking​ ​at​ ​a​ ​1​ ​to 
10,000​ ​cohort,​ ​19%​ ​had​ ​earned​ ​patents,​ ​as​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​7.5%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Q4​ ​group,​ ​3.8%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Q1 
group,​ ​or​ ​1%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​general​ ​population. 
 
It​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​emphasize​ ​that​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​we’ve​ ​reviewed​ ​so​ ​far​ ​does​ ​not​ ​merely​ ​mean​ ​that 
AI​ ​could​ ​potentially​ ​learn​ ​faster​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​time:​ ​it​ ​also​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​potentially 
learn​ ​faster​ ​​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​training​ ​data​.​ ​The​ ​smaller​ ​datasets​ ​AI​ ​needs​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​accurate 
models,​ ​the​ ​faster​ ​it​ ​can​ ​adapt​ ​to​ ​new​ ​situations.  
 
Besides​ ​the​ ​considerations​ ​we​ ​have​ ​already​ ​discussed,​ ​there​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​potential​ ​for 
accelerated​ ​learning​ ​through​ ​more​ ​detailed​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​experiences.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​chess​ ​players 
improve​ ​most​ ​effectively​ ​by​ ​studying​ ​the​ ​games​ ​of​ ​grandmasters,​ ​and​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​what 
moves​ ​the​ ​grandmasters​ ​would​ ​have​ ​made​ ​in​ ​any​ ​situation.​ ​When​ ​the​ ​grandmaster​ ​play 
deviates​ ​from​ ​the​ ​move​ ​that​ ​the​ ​student​ ​would​ ​have​ ​made,​ ​the​ ​student​ ​goes​ ​back​ ​to​ ​try​ ​to​ ​see 
what​ ​they​ ​missed​ ​(Ericsson​ ​&​ ​Pool,​ ​2016).​ ​This​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​detailed​ ​study​ ​is​ ​effortful​ ​however,​ ​and 
can​ ​only​ ​be​ ​sustained​ ​for​ ​limited​ ​amounts​ ​at​ ​a​ ​time.​ ​With​ ​enough​ ​computational​ ​resources,​ ​the 





























































AI​ ​could​ ​routinely​ ​run​ ​this​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​on​ ​all​ ​sense​ ​data​ ​it​ ​received,​ ​constantly​ ​attempting​ ​to 
build​ ​increasingly​ ​detailed​ ​models​ ​that​ ​would​ ​correctly​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​data. 
How​ ​much​ ​interaction​ ​is​ ​needed? 
Some​ ​commentators,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Hibbard​ ​(2016)​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​knowledge​ ​requires​ ​interaction​ ​with​ ​the 
world,​ ​so​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​would​ ​be​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​over​ ​an​ ​extended​ ​period​ ​of​ ​time​ ​as​ ​the​ ​interaction 
takes​ ​time. 
 
From​ ​our​ ​previous​ ​review,​ ​we​ ​know​ ​that​ ​feedback​ ​is​ ​needed​ ​for​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​expertise. 
However,​ ​one​ ​may​ ​also​ ​get​ ​feedback​ ​from​ ​studying​ ​static​ ​materials.​ ​As​ ​we​ ​noted​ ​before,​ ​chess 
players​ ​spend​ ​more​ ​time​ ​studying​ ​published​ ​matches​ ​and​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​the​ ​grandmaster 
moves​ ​–​ ​and​ ​then​ ​getting​ ​feedback​ ​when​ ​they​ ​look​ ​up​ ​the​ ​next​ ​move​ ​and​ ​have​ ​their​ ​prediction 
confirmed​ ​or​ ​falsified​ ​–​ ​than​ ​they​ ​do​ ​actually​ ​playing​ ​matches​ ​against​ ​live​ ​opponents​ ​(Ericsson 
&​ ​Pool,​ ​2016).​ ​The​ ​Go-playing​ ​AlphaGo​ ​system​ ​did​ ​not​ ​achieve​ ​its​ ​skill​ ​by​ ​spending​ ​large 
amounts​ ​of​ ​time​ ​playing​ ​human​ ​opponents,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​studying​ ​the​ ​games​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​and 
playing​ ​games​ ​against​ ​itself​ ​(Silver​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2016).​ ​And​ ​while​ ​any​ ​individual​ ​human​ ​can​ ​only​ ​study 
a​ ​single​ ​game​ ​at​ ​a​ ​time,​ ​AI​ ​systems​ ​could​ ​study​ ​a​ ​vast​ ​number​ ​of​ ​games​ ​in​ ​parallel​ ​and​ ​learn 
from​ ​all​ ​of​ ​them . 10
 
An​ ​important​ ​difference​ ​is​ ​that​ ​domains​ ​such​ ​as​ ​chess​ ​and​ ​Go​ ​are​ ​formally​ ​specified​ ​domains, 
which​ ​AI​ ​can​ ​perfectly​ ​simulate.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​domain​ ​such​ ​as​ ​social​ ​interaction,​ ​the​ ​AI’s​ ​ability​ ​to 
accurately​ ​simulate​ ​the​ ​behavior​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​is​ ​limited​ ​by​ ​its​ ​current​ ​competence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​domain. 
While​ ​it​ ​can​ ​run​ ​a​ ​simulation​ ​based​ ​on​ ​its​ ​existing​ ​model​ ​of​ ​human​ ​behavior,​ ​predicting​ ​how 
humans​ ​would​ ​behave​ ​based​ ​on​ ​that​ ​model,​ ​it​ ​needs​ ​external​ ​data​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​find​ ​out​ ​how 
accurate​ ​its​ ​prediction​ ​was. 
 
This​ ​is​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​a​ ​problem​ ​however,​ ​given​ ​the​ ​vast​ ​(and​ ​ever-increasing)​ ​amount​ ​of 
recorded​ ​social​ ​interaction​ ​happening​ ​online.​ ​YouTube,​ ​e-mail​ ​lists,​ ​forums,​ ​blogs,​ ​and​ ​social 
media​ ​services​ ​all​ ​provide​ ​rich​ ​records​ ​of​ ​various​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​social​ ​interaction,​ ​for​ ​AI​ ​to​ ​test​ ​its 
predictive​ ​models​ ​against​ ​without​ ​needing​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​in​ ​interaction​ ​of​ ​its​ ​own.​ ​Scientific​ ​papers​ ​– 
increasingly​ ​available​ ​on​ ​an​ ​open​ ​access​ ​basis​ ​–​ ​on​ ​topics​ ​such​ ​as​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​sociology 
offer​ ​additional​ ​information​ ​for​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​to​ ​supplement​ ​its​ ​understanding​ ​with,​ ​as​ ​do​ ​various​ ​guides 
to​ ​social​ ​skills.​ ​All​ ​of​ ​this​ ​information​ ​could​ ​be​ ​acquired​ ​simply​ ​by​ ​downloading​ ​it,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​main 
constraints​ ​being​ ​the​ ​time​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​find,​ ​download,​ ​and​ ​process​ ​the​ ​data,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​time 
needed​ ​for​ ​social​ ​interactions.  
 
As​ ​noted​ ​earlier,​ ​relatively​ ​crude​ ​statistical​ ​methods​ ​can​ ​already​ ​extract​ ​relatively​ ​accurate 
psychological​ ​profiles​ ​out​ ​of​ ​data​ ​such​ ​as​ ​people’s​ ​Facebook​ ​'likes'​ ​(​Kosinski​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2013​, 
Youyou​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2015​),​ ​giving​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​suspect​ ​that​ ​a​ ​general​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​develop​ ​very​ ​accurate 
predictive​ ​abilities​ ​given​ ​the​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​a​ ​process​ ​described​ ​above. 
10 ​ ​See​ ​Mnih​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​(2016)​ ​for​ ​a​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​how​ ​incorporating​ ​parallel​ ​learning​ ​improves​ ​upon​ ​on​ ​modern 
deep​ ​learning​ ​systems. 






























































Several​ ​other​ ​domains,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​software​ ​security​ ​and​ ​mathematics​ ​seem​ ​similarly​ ​amenable​ ​to 
being​ ​mastered​ ​largely​ ​without​ ​needing​ ​to​ ​interact​ ​with​ ​the​ ​world​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​AI,​ ​other​ ​than 
searching​ ​for​ ​relevant​ ​materials.​ ​Some​ ​domains​ ​such​ ​as​ ​physics​ ​would​ ​probably​ ​need​ ​novel 
experiments,​ ​but​ ​AI​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​domains​ ​that​ ​were​ ​the​ ​easiest​ ​and​ ​fastest​ ​for​ ​it​ ​to​ ​master 
might​ ​find​ ​sufficient​ ​sources​ ​of​ ​capability​ ​from​ ​those​ ​alone.  
 
Given​ ​the​ ​above​ ​considerations,​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​seem​ ​like​ ​AI’s​ ​speed​ ​of​ ​learning​ ​would​ ​necessarily 
be​ ​strongly​ ​interaction-constrained. 
Conclusions 
We​ ​set​ ​out​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​the​ ​fundamental​ ​practical​ ​limits​ ​of​ ​intelligence,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​limits​ ​to​ ​how 
quickly​ ​an​ ​AI​ ​system​ ​could​ ​acquire​ ​very​ ​high​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​capability. 
 
Fictional​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​high​ ​intelligence​ ​often​ ​depict​ ​a​ ​picture​ ​of​ ​geniuses​ ​as​ ​masterminds 
who​ ​have​ ​an​ ​almost​ ​godlike​ ​prediction​ ​ability,​ ​laying​ ​out​ ​intricate​ ​multi-step​ ​plans​ ​where​ ​every 
contingency​ ​is​ ​planned​ ​for​ ​in​ ​advance​ ​(TVTropes​ ​2017a).​ ​When​ ​discussing​ ​“superintelligent”​ ​AI 
systems,​ ​one​ ​might​ ​easily​ ​think​ ​that​ ​the​ ​discussion​ ​was​ ​postulating​ ​something​ ​along​ ​the​ ​lines​ ​of 
those​ ​fictional​ ​examples,​ ​and​ ​rightly​ ​reject​ ​it​ ​as​ ​unrealistic. 
 
Given​ ​what​ ​we​ ​know​ ​about​ ​the​ ​limits​ ​of​ ​prediction,​ ​for​ ​AI​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​single​ ​plan​ ​which​ ​takes​ ​into 
account​ ​every​ ​possibility​ ​is​ ​surely​ ​impossible.​ ​However,​ ​having​ ​reviewed​ ​the​ ​science​ ​of​ ​human 
expertise,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​found​ ​that​ ​experts​ ​who​ ​are​ ​good​ ​at​ ​their​ ​domains​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​powerful 
mental​ ​representations​ ​which​ ​let​ ​them​ ​react​ ​to​ ​various​ ​situations​ ​as​ ​they​ ​arise,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​simulate 
different​ ​plans​ ​and​ ​outcomes​ ​in​ ​their​ ​heads.  
 
Looking​ ​from​ ​humans​ ​to​ ​AIs,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​found​ ​that​ ​AI​ ​might​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​run​ ​much​ ​more 
sophisticated​ ​mental​ ​simulations​ ​than​ ​humans​ ​could.​ ​Given​ ​human​ ​intelligence​ ​differences​ ​and 
empirical​ ​and​ ​theoretical​ ​considerations​ ​about​ ​working​ ​memory​ ​being​ ​a​ ​major​ ​constraint​ ​for 
intelligence,​ ​the​ ​empirical​ ​finding​ ​that​ ​increased​ ​intelligence​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​benefit​ ​people 
throughout​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​human​ ​range,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​observation​ ​that​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​unlikely​ ​for​ ​the 
theoretical​ ​limits​ ​of​ ​intelligence​ ​to​ ​coincide​ ​with​ ​the​ ​biological​ ​and​ ​physical​ ​constraints​ ​that 
human​ ​intelligence​ ​currently​ ​faces,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​AIs​ ​could​ ​come​ ​to​ ​learn​ ​considerably​ ​faster 
from​ ​data​ ​than​ ​humans​ ​do.​ ​It​ ​also​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​in​ ​many​ ​domains,​ ​this​ ​could​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​by​ ​using 
existing​ ​materials​ ​as​ ​a​ ​source​ ​of​ ​feedback​ ​for​ ​predictions,​ ​without​ ​necessarily​ ​being​ ​constrained 
by​ ​time​ ​taken​ ​for​ ​interacting​ ​with​ ​the​ ​external​ ​world. 
 
Thus,​ ​it​ ​looks​ ​that​ ​even​ ​though​ ​an​ ​AI​ ​system​ ​couldn’t​ ​make​ ​a​ ​single​ ​superplan​ ​for​ ​world 
conquest​ ​right​ ​from​ ​the​ ​beginning,​ ​it​ ​could​ ​still​ ​have​ ​a​ ​superhuman​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​adapt​ ​and​ ​learn 
from​ ​changing​ ​and​ ​novel​ ​situations,​ ​and​ ​react​ ​to​ ​those​ ​faster​ ​than​ ​its​ ​human​ ​adversaries.​ ​As​ ​an 
analogy,​ ​experts​ ​playing​ ​most​ ​games​ ​can't​ ​precompute​ ​a​ ​winning​ ​strategy​ ​right​ ​from​ ​the​ ​first 





























































move​ ​either,​ ​but​ ​they​ ​can​ ​still​ ​react​ ​and​ ​adapt​ ​to​ ​the​ ​game's​ ​evolving​ ​situation​ ​better​ ​than​ ​a 
novice​ ​can,​ ​enabling​ ​them​ ​to​ ​win . 11
 
Many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​hypothetical​ ​advantages​ ​–​ ​such​ ​as​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​working​ ​memory,​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​consider 
more​ ​possibilities​ ​at​ ​once,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​practice​ ​on​ ​many​ ​training​ ​instances​ ​in​ ​parallel​ ​–​ ​that 
AI​ ​might​ ​have​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​depend​ ​on​ ​available​ ​computing​ ​power.​ ​Thus​ ​the​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​hardware​ ​the 
AI​ ​had​ ​at​ ​its​ ​disposal​ ​could​ ​limit​ ​its​ ​capabilities,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​exists​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​developing 
better-optimized​ ​algorithms​ ​by​ ​initially​ ​specializing​ ​in​ ​fields​ ​such​ ​as​ ​programming​ ​and​ ​theoretical 
computer​ ​science,​ ​which​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​might​ ​become​ ​very​ ​good​ ​at. 
 
One​ ​consideration​ ​which​ ​we​ ​have​ ​not​ ​yet​ ​properly​ ​addressed​ ​is​ ​the​ ​technology​ ​landscape​ ​at​ ​the 
time​ ​when​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​arrives​ ​(​Tomasik​ ​2014/2016,​ ​sec.​ ​7​).​ ​If​ ​a​ ​general​ ​AI​ ​can​ ​be​ ​developed,​ ​then 
various​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​sophisticated​ ​narrow​ ​AI​ ​will​ ​also​ ​be​ ​in​ ​existence.​ ​Some​ ​of​ ​them​ ​could​ ​be​ ​used 
to​ ​detect​ ​and​ ​react​ ​to​ ​a​ ​general​ ​AI,​ ​and​ ​tools​ ​such​ ​as​ ​sophisticated​ ​personal​ ​profiling​ ​for 
purposes​ ​of​ ​social​ ​manipulation​ ​will​ ​likely​ ​already​ ​be​ ​in​ ​existence.​ ​Considering​ ​how​ ​these 
influence​ ​the​ ​considerations​ ​discussed​ ​here​ ​is​ ​an​ ​important​ ​question,​ ​but​ ​one​ ​which​ ​is​ ​outside 
the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​article. 
 
In​ ​summary,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​AI​ ​could​ ​not​ ​create​ ​a​ ​complete​ ​master​ ​plan​ ​from​ ​scratch,​ ​there​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be 
a​ ​reasonable​ ​chance​ ​that​ ​could​ ​still​ ​come​ ​to​ ​substantially​ ​outperform​ ​humans​ ​in​ ​many​ ​domains, 
developing​ ​and​ ​using​ ​superior​ ​expertise​ ​than​ ​what​ ​humans​ ​were​ ​capable​ ​of.​ ​How​ ​fast​ ​AI 
systems​ ​could​ ​develop​ ​to​ ​such​ ​a​ ​level​ ​would​ ​depend​ ​on​ ​the​ ​speed​ ​at​ ​which​ ​algorithmic​ ​and 
hardware​ ​improvements​ ​became​ ​available.​ ​They​ ​could​ ​potentially​ ​be​ ​very​ ​fast,​ ​if​ ​e.g.​ ​the 
required​ ​algorithmic​ ​insights​ ​were​ ​more​ ​on​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​scaling​ ​up​ ​the​ ​size​ ​of​ ​the​ ​AI’s​ ​simulations 
and​ ​number​ ​of​ ​attentional​ ​streams,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​requiring​ ​any​ ​genuinely​ ​new​ ​ideas​ ​compared​ ​to 
what​ ​allowed​ ​the​ ​AI​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​a​ ​rough​ ​human​ ​level​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​place. 
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